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RACE, IDENTITY, AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY: WHY LEGAL SERVICES
ORGANIZATIONS NEED AFRICAN
AMERICAN STAFF ATTORNEYS
Shani M. King*
Given the fundamental importance of the attorney-client relation-
ship in securing favorable outcomes for clients, legal services organiza-
tions that serve large populations of African Americans should employ
African American staff attorneys because: (1) African American lawyers
and clients share a group identity that makes it more likely that a black
attorney will be able to gain a black client's trust; (2) black attorneys
communicate more effectively with black clients; and (3) the perception
of a judicial system that is unfair and racist is likely to encourage black
clients to trust black lawyers more than white lawyers, who are more
likely to be perceived as part of "the system."
Empirical evidence from the legal and medical fields show that Afri-
can American clients are more likely to trust and communicate effec-
tively with African American service providers. This Article also
explores, however, the reasons why some African Americans may not
want a black attorney. One reason is that black clients may feel "better
off" with a white lawyer precisely because racism infects the American
judicial system. Another reason may be that some African Americans
may believe that white lawyers are better lawyers. Finally, in some cir-
cumstances, a black client may not want a black lawyer if he perceives
the lawyer as "not black enough." Notwithstanding some of these pref-
erences, however, the empirical evidence strongly suggests that more
often than not, black clients prefer black lawyers.
Because race consideration in staffing implicates discrimination
law, this Article also considers recent Supreme Court precedent that af-
fects the ability of certain organizations to engage in color-conscious
actions. According to a plurality of the Court in Parents Involved in
* Assistant Professor and Co-Director, Center on Children and Families, at the Univer-
sity of Florida Levin College of Law. J.D. Harvard Law School, B.A., Brown University. I
am very grateful to Katheryn Russell-Brown, Nancy Dowd, N. Jeremi Duru, Michele Good-
win, Martha Minow, Kenneth B. Nunn, Imani Perry, L. Song Richardson, and Gabriela Ruiz
for reviewing various drafts of this Article. Cindy Zimmerman provided invaluable research
assistance. I also thank Dean Robert Jerry, who, through the generous summer research pro-
gram at the University of Florida, Levin College of Law, supported the writing of this Article,
and the staff of the University of Florida Legal Information Center.
HeinOnline  -- 18 Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 1 2008-2009
2 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1., the school assign-
ment programs at issue conflicted with the premise of Brown, which re-
quires strict adherence to colorblindness. Unfortunately, this approach
ignores the continuing power of race and is a stark departure from Jus-
tice Blackmun's defense of affirmative action in Bakke. While a defini-
tive conclusion as to when the law allows color-consciousness is difficult
in light of the Court's recent decisions, the theme of this Article echoes
Justice Blackmun. In essence, this Article argues that we cannot solve
the problems that face African Americans by removing race-conscious-
ness from the dialogue about diversity in the legal profession.
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It was the first time that I was meeting this client, a bright kid in
foster care who was living with his grandparents. The lawyer who was
transitioning off the case-one of my colleagues who also worked for the
non-profit legal services organization that I worked for-told me that
this would be a good case for me, in part, because I am black and be-
cause she wanted this client to have a black role model to emulate. (My
colleague was white.) The client, Oswold, and his grandparents, Jimmy
and Lisa, were black. When we arrived at their house for our first home
[Vol. 18:1
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visit, we sat in the living room. My colleague sat in a chair, my new
client and his grandfather sat in a loveseat, and I sat next to my client's
grandmother. While we were discussing some of the frustrations of navi-
gating the school system, my client's grandmother revved up, slapped me
on the leg, and exclaimed, "You know what I'm saying!" I looked at her
slightly surprised, but I then quickly smiled. Apparently, she felt com-
fortable with me. Why? Well, maybe, just maybe, because I am black.
INTRODUCTION: RACE AND THE
ATtORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
The attorney-client relationship is a crucial component of effective
service delivery. One of the primary purposes of the attorney-client priv-
ilege is to promote "full and frank communication" between an attorney
and client by protecting attorney-client conversations from disclosure.'
Given the fundamental importance of the attorney-client relationship in
securing favorable outcomes for clients, legal services organizations
should facilitate full and frank communication between attorneys and
their clients. What this means in practice, at least in part, is that legal
services organizations that serve large populations of African American
clients should employ staff attorneys who are most likely to en-
gender trust and facilitate communication with their clients. Con-
sequently, these organizations should employ African American 2 staff
1 See Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998) (quoting Upjohn Co.
v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)); see also Corey D. Babington, Note, Preserving
the Attorney-Client Relationship After United States v. Anderson, 49 U. KAN. L. REv. 221,
238 (2000) (citing Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389).
2 When I refer to blacks, African Americans, or black Americans, I am referring both to
a physical and sociocultural concept of race. Practically speaking, I am referring to those
whom others would identify as a black American, and those who would self-identify as black
American. The origin of the term race has been traced to nineteenth century colonialism and
anthropology. See Neil J. Smelser et al., Introduction, in I AMERICA BECOMING: RACIAL
TRENDS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES 2 [hereinafter AMERICA BECOMING] (Neil J. Smelser et al.
eds., 2001). During the 19th century, the world's populations were classified often by "skin
color-white, black, yellow, brown, and red." Id. Prior to the 20th century, "[t]he widely
accepted definitional basis was biological-skin color, distinctive facial characteristics, height,
build, hair texture, and other physical features, as well as temperamental and psychological
traits." Id. Race, conceived of in this narrow way, allowed some races to be classified as
biologically superior to others, ultimately being used to "justify racial discrimination, colonial
domination, slavery, genocide, and holocaust." Id. In the 20th century, due to the work of
behavioral and social scientists, this narrow conception of race was logically discredited with
"evidence on millennia of human migration, contact, and genetic diversification through cross-
reproduction." Id. at 2-3. Consequently, the sociocultural aspects of the concept of race have
developed while "continuing to acknowledge the genetic, demographic, and geographic
dimensions of human diversity." Id. at 3. Social scientists now agree "that both race and
ethnicity derive from sociocultural categories that are produced, sustained, and reproduced."
Id. Thus, for this discussion, I will use the following conception of race: "'race' is a social
category based on the identification of(]) a physical marker transmitted through reproduction
and (2) individual, group, and cultural attributes associated with that marker." Id. Another
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attorneys. 3
Legal services organizations that serve large populations of African
American clients should employ African American attorneys for three
primary reasons: (1) African American lawyers and clients share a group
identity that makes it more likely that a black attorney will be able to
gain a black client's trust; (2) black attorneys communicate more effec-
tively with black clients; and (3) the perception of a judicial system that
is unfair and racist is likely to encourage black clients to trust black law-
yers more than white lawyers, who are more likely to be perceived as
part of "the system."'4
way to think about race is as a form of ethnicity, but an ethnicity that incorporates distinguish-
ing physical characteristics. See id.
There are some cautionary notes regarding the definition of race that I am using in the follow-
ing discussion of race. First, taken to its extreme, one could conceivably argue that given my
working definition, race is a figment of our imagination. But race is "real" because it is real to
individuals and is a well-established part of our institutional life. See id. Second, the terms
race and ethnicity are complex social phenomena that are very difficult to describe, define, or
measure. See id. at 4. The inherent complexity of these terms makes it difficult to answer
questions such as: What physical markers should we be considering? Does, or for that matter,
should others' attribution matter? How about self-selection? Should we consider ancestry?
Thus, I emphasize that the working definition of race that I am using for the purposes of this
discussion is an "analytic strategy rather than a reflection of some fixed social reality." Id.
Also, while on a fundamental level I acknowledge and appreciate the fact that blacks may
consider race a significant part of their identity, I also acknowledge and appreciate that it is not
clear what the content of this identity will be. See David B. Wilkins, Identities and Roles:
Race, Recognition, and Professional Responsibility, 57 MD. L. REv. 1509, 1534 (1998) [here-
inafter Wilkins, Identities and Roles]. "As theorists from Kimberle Crenshaw to William Ju-
lius Wilson trenchantly argue, those of us who are 'black' also have a gender, a social class,
and a sexual orientation." id. at 1533. Thus, I freely recognize that, even if one considers race
a primary aspect of his character or persona, those standing at the nexus of several categories
may ascribe a different meaning to any one category, such as race. See id. at 1533-34. Of
course, my argument assumes that race is indeed significant. I agree with David Wilkins when
he argues, "The existence of gender, class, political, and geographic differences among black
Americans has yet to sever the ties that create a common, albeit richly diverse, African Ameri-
can culture in the United States." Id. at 1562.
A reasonable question is whether this definition includes black immigrants from, for example,
Jamaica, Ethiopia, or Trinidad. It could, if they would be identified by others as a black
American and would self-identify as such. But see Michael A. Omi, The Changing Meaning
of Race, in 1 AMERICA BECOMING, supra, at 246 (discussing recent immigrants who do not
identify as black Americans).
3 My argument here is not that legal services organizations that serve large populations
of African American clients should employ exclusively African American staff attorneys, but
only that it is important for these organizations to employ some African American staff attor-
neys to address the needs of their African American clients. Similarly, while not discussed at
length in this Article, Grutter's diversity rationale discussed infra (which can be read to call
for the exposure of lawyers and clients to those who are different from themselves, which, in
this context, might increase the capacity of legal services organizations to work effectively
with diverse populations) is an important consideration. See infra text accompanying notes
259-69.
4 In this Article I do not discuss at length the question of whether the same is true in
other contexts, such as women preferring women attorneys, black women preferring black
women attorneys, Jewish people preferring Jewish attorneys, etc. My partial answer to this
[Vol. 18:1
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While there has been some scholarship in this area, it has focused
on people of color generally,5 or on the concerns that a black client may
have when represented by a white lawyer, and how these concerns might
be addressed in the context of that white lawyer-black client
relationship. 6
My argument may be distinguished from existing scholarship in two
ways. First, I focus exclusively on African Americans. Second, I argue
that legal services organizations will be most effective in serving African
American clients if they have African Americans on staff. In other
question is yes, the same is true for other social groups, provided that the social group at issue
is what Professor Owen Fiss has described as a "specially disadvantaged group," defined not
only by social group status, but also by perpetual subordination and a position in which their
political power is circumscribed. See Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause,
5 PHIL. & PUB. AF. 107, 154-55 (1976). While an exhaustive discussion of this question is
beyond the scope of this Article (consequently, I do not address the question of what limiting
principles might apply to this definition) this Article is part of a larger project that examines
the use of race, identity, and the law to promote social change. See id. One scholar has
written a thoughtful article on the concept of representation that touches on these issues. See
generally Martha L. Minow, From Class Actions to Miss Saigon: The Concept of Representa-
tion in the Law, 39 CLEv. ST. L. REv. 269 (1991). Other scholars have touched on the concept
of ethnic match, both in and outside of the legal profession. One scholar notes, "As a group,
attorneys of color [aire much more likely to perceive ... the advantages ... in dealing with
their clients, including better communication .... " Roland Acevedo et al., Race and Repre-
sentation: A Study of Legal Aid Attorneys and Their Perceptions of the Significance of Race,
18 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 65 (2000); see also Frederick M. Chen et al., Patients' Beliefs About
Racism, Preferences for Physician Race, and Satisfaction with Care, 3 ANNALS FAM. MED.
138, 138 (2005) ("Latinos with stronger beliefs about discrimination in health care were more
likely to prefer a Latino physician .... "); Glenn Gamst et al., Ethnic Match and Treatment
Outcomes for Child and Adolescent Mental Health Center Clients, 82 J. COUNSELING & DEV.
457 (2004) (investigating the effects of client ethnicity and client-counselor ethnic match on
treatment outcomes of 1,946 children and adolescent community health center clients and find-
ing that clinical outcomes were maximized when Latino and African American mood disorder
clients were ethnically matched). Some scholars have also discussed how gender and class
interact with race. See generally PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT:
KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS, AND Tm POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT (1991); see also Evelyn
Brooks Higginbotham, African-American Women's History and the Metalanguage of Race, 17
SIGNS 251, 251 (1992).
5 See generally Acevedo et al., supra note 4. While the authors in this study recognize
that the only way to improve the representation of poor clients of color is to increase the
number of attorneys of color (because lawyers of color may be better able to interpret the
"narrative" of clients of color), the authors do not discuss the sociocultural characteristics of
African Americans that are critical to understanding why legal services organizations should
hire African American staff attorneys to represent African American clients. Id.
6 See Kenneth P. Troccoli, "I Want a Black Lawyer to Represent Me": Addressing a
Black Defendant's Concerns with Being Assigned a White Court-Appointed Lawyer, 20 LAW
& NEQ. 1, 17-26 (2002). Troccoli concludes that in order to truly effectuate a defendant's
right to counsel, "the appointed lawyer and the other actors in the criminal justice system
should become more race-conscious and not only communicate better about race, but also
acknowledge and address the concerns, whether real or perceived, that underlie an African-
American defendant's objections to being appointed a lawyer who happens to be Caucasian."
Id. at 51. Thus, Troccoli implies that optimal communication in the context of an attorney-
client relationship can be achieved through some measure of cultural competence. Id.
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words, cultural competence training in legal services organizations is not
enough. In a fundamental way, this Article is about what legal services
organizations must do to remain committed to the social justice princi-
ples to which they ascribe.
A premise of this Article is that the experience of African Ameri-
cans cannot be generalized to the experiences of another group; to say
that it can ignores the reality of African Americans. Race, especially for
African Americans, has a gravity that cannot be understood if taken out
of its socio-political-legal and historical context. The experience of Afri-
can Americans cannot be fully communicated in books, documentaries,
law school, or by cultural competence trainers-it is something that must
be lived. Therefore, legal services organizations cannot improve their
service delivery to clients by simply hiring cultural competence trainers.
My argument proceeds in six parts. Part I discusses African Ameri-
can group identity and the relevance of that identity to the ability of Afri-
can American lawyers to gain their clients' trust. Part II presents
empirical evidence showing that African American service providers
communicate better with African American clients than do non-African
American service providers. Part III discusses the perception of a two-
tiered judicial system in this country and how this perception among Af-
rican Americans is likely to encourage black clients to trust black law-
yers more than white lawyers. In this section, I also discuss why this
perception makes it particularly important for legal services organiza-
tions to employ African American attorneys if they are to been seen as
credible and legitimate by African Americans. Part IV discusses reasons
why, in certain circumstances, African American clients may prefer not
to have an African American attorney. Part V addresses David Wilkins'
work in this area and refutes the argument that the use of one's racial
identity when practicing law undermines the principles that underlie the
dominant model of American legal ethics. Finally, Part VI discusses
when and where the law allows color-consciousness given the recent Su-
preme Court decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seat-
tle School District No. 1.7 The final section concludes.
7 127 S.Ct. 2738 (2007). This case is the consolidation of two cases brought by parents
challenging the integration programs in school districts in Jefferson County, Kentucky, and
Seattle, Washington.
[Vol. 18:1
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I. TRUST AND THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
A. Black American Group Identity
The existence of a black group identity has been implicitly recog-
nized by legal scholars, 8 historians, 9 authors,' 0 and theorists' 1-most no-
tably by Frantz Fanon in his seminal work Black Skin White Masks. 12
Fanon was formally trained in medicine and psychiatry,1 3 but also wrote
political essays and plays. In 1952, Fanon presented the world with
Black Skin White Masks as his first analysis and manifesto of the effects
of racism on the black psyche. 14 Throughout this work, Fanon speaks of
psychological constructions that bind the black man, i.e., a black con-
sciousness and the psychological health of the black man.' 5 In Black
Skin White Masks, Fanon recognizes that the socio-political-legal and
historical environment in which blacks live has created a black group
identity. 16
8 See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 4, at 148. In his seminal article, "Groups and the Equal
Protection Clause," Professor Fiss recognizes the importance of the concept of black group
identity, and argues for an interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause that is based on a
fuller (and more accurate) picture of social reality.
9 See, e.g., W. D. WRIGHT, BLACK HISTORY AND BLACK IDENTITY: A CALL FOR A NEW
HISTORIOGRAPHY 1-7 (2002). Wright notes that the historical evidence regarding African
identity and the group identity of blacks in America is often downplayed or ignored, which has
hampered the ability of historians to study the black experience in America in an accurate way.
10 See generally RICHARD WRIGHT, BLACK Boy: A RECORD OF CHILDHOOD & YOUTH
(Harper & Row 1945) (1937) (telling the story of a black youth coming of age in the Jim Crow
south); RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN (Signet 1952) (1947) (chronicling the travels of a
young black man as he searches for his place in an America that is culturally intolerant).
II See, e.g., FRANTZ FANON, BLACK SKIN WHITE MASKS 113 (Charles Lam Markmann
trans., 1967) (1952).
12 See id. at 16. Fanon was actually not African American, but was Franco-Caribbean as
he was bom in the Antilles. See DAVID MACEY, FRANTZ FANON: A BIOGRAPHY 5 (2000).
Fanon's work was based on many of his observations of north and sub-Saharan Africans. See
FANON, supra note 11, at 14. Thus, there is a pan-Africanist/universalist flavor to his work.
Fanon's work, however, has been widely recognized as applicable to the black American expe-
rience. See, e.g., Steven R. Morrison, Will to Power, Will to Reality, and Racial Profiling:
How the White Male Dominant Power Structure Creates Itself as Law Abiding Citizen
Through the Creaiion of Black as Criminal, 2 Nw. J. L. & Soc. POL'Y 63, 68 (2007) ("Frantz
Fanon's view of relations between the European colonizer and the African colonized [is] as
applicable today in America as ever .....
13 See MACEY, supra note 12, at 134.
14 See id. at 154-99; see also Gwen Bergner, Who Is That Masked Woman? Or, The Role
of Gender in Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks, 110 PMLA 75, 75 (1995).
15 See FANON, supra note 11, at 141-209 (explaining the relationship between "The Ne-
gro and Psychopathology"). While I acknowledge that Fanon's book and analysis is ground-
breaking, I do not agree with Fanon's simplistic and unsympathetic portrait of the black
woman's complicity in colonization.
16 See id. Fanon makes explicit the cultural construction of racial subjectivity and avoids
essentializing racial identity. I aim to do the same to the extent that I discuss racial identity in
this Article.
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Fanon presents the results of his psychoanalysis of the black psyche
with chapter titles such as: "The Negro and Language," "The Woman of
Color and the White Man," "The Man of Color and the White Woman,"
"The So-Called Dependency Complex of Colonized Peoples," "The Fact
of Blackness," "The Negro and Psychopathology," and "The Negro and
Recognition." Fanon's titles suggest that he implicitly supports the no-
tion of a black group identity, i.e., a connection between black people
that can be described in general terms. Fanon does not try to define what
it means to be black, or list "essential" characteristics one needs to be
black, but does recognize that most black people are connected. 17 Fanon
explicitly summarizes the content of the chapters in Black Skin White
Masks, illustrating his belief in an identity that is defined, in part, by the
color of one's skin:
The first three chapters deal with the modem Negro. I
take the black man of today and I try to establish his
attitudes in the white world. The last two chapters are
devoted to an attempt at a psychopathological and philo-
sophical explanation of the state of being a Negro.18
Throughout Black Skin White Masks, Fanon speaks in terms of a
single black psyche or a single black collective consciousness and explic-
itly uses the term "Negro consciousness," recognizing that there is an
identity that comes with being black.19 Fanon notes that the essence of
this identity is the failure of society to acknowledge the black man's
individuality or emotional reality:
I move slowly in the world, accustomed now to seek no
longer for upheaval. I progress by crawling. And al-
ready I am being dissected under white eyes, the only
real eyes. I amfixed. Having adjusted their microtomes,
they objectively cut away slices of [structure the con-
tours of] my reality. I am laid bare [betrayed]. I feel, I
see in those white faces that it is not a new man who has
come in, but a new kind of man, a new genus. Why, it's
a Negro [nigger]!20
17 See id. at 134-35; see also Bergner, supra note 14, at 75. Bergner recognizes that
Black Skin, White Masks effects "a paradigm shift that reconfigures psychoanalysis to account
for . . . black [group] identity [that] is shaped by the oppressive sociopolitical structure of
colonial culture." Id. at 76.
18 FANON, supra note 11, at 15.
19 Id. at 135.
20 Anjali Prabhu, Narration in Frantz Fanon's peau noire masques blancs: Some Recon-
siderations, 37 Ras. AFR. Lrr. 189, 196 (2006) (quoting FANON, supra note 11, at 116) (brack-
ets in original). In explaining this passage, Professor Prabhu notes that it illustrates the black
man is "not at liberty to construct his own reality." Id. Professor Prabhu adds the bracketed
words to emphasize that the reality of the black man has not really been "cut away," but rather
[Vol. 18:1
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Similarly, Professor Prabhu, an expert in postcolonial studies, has
observed that the black identity is one in which "the black man's body is
given to him through the harsh gaze of the white man through a cultural
lens informed by stereotypes inherited from colonialism. '21 Professor
Prabhu supports this observation by referencing language from Black
Skin White Masks:
And then the occasion arose when I [we] had to meet the
white man's eyes. An unfamiliar weight burdened me
[us]. The real world challenged my [our] claims. In the
white world the man of color encounters difficulties in
the development of his bodily schema. Consciousness
of the body is solely a negating activity. It is a third-
person consciousness. The body is surrounded by an at-
mosphere of certain uncertainty. 22
Fanon also observes that part of being black is being in a society in
which language is used as a tool to keep the black man in his place:
A white man addressing a Negro behaves exactly like an
adult with a child and starts smirking, whispering, pa-
tronizing, cozening. It is not one white man I have
watched, but hundreds; and I have not limited my inves-
tigation to any one class but, if I may claim an essen-
tially objective position, I have made a point of
observing such behavior in physicians, policemen,
employers. 23
A society that attempts to keep blacks in their place through lan-
guage reflects a dominant culture that automatically classifies and de-
civilizes black Americans.24 Fanon also suggests that the black psyche
includes growing up in a society in which negative attitudes about blacks
persist:
Over three or four years I questioned some 500 members
of the white race . . . . [11n the midst of associational
has been structured by society in a way that fails to recognize his individual or emotional
reality. Id.
21 Id. at 197.
22 Id. (quoting FANON, supra note 11, at 110-11 (emphasis added, brackets in original)).
Professor Prabhu sees that in this quote Fanon recognized a unique challenge that the black
man faces-he has to establish his "selfhood" and person outside the various "constraints that
have been actualized through the history of colonialism." Id. at 198. These constraints have
been recognized by many, including Professor Charles Lawrence in his groundbreaking explo-
ration of subtle (or modem) racism discussed infra note 30.
23 FANON, supra note 11, at 31. In Black Skin White Masks, Fanon illustrates the "white
man's perspective" when he writes, "Talking to Negroes in this way gets down to their level, it
puts them at ease, it is an effort to make them understand us, it reassures them . I..." Id. at 32.
24 See id. at 32.
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tests, I inserted the word Negro among some twenty
others. Almost 60 per cent of the replies took this form:
Negro brought forth biology, penis, strong, athletic, po-
tent, boxer, Joe Louis, Jesse Owens, Senegalese troops,
savage, animal, devil, sin.
It is interesting to note that one in fifty reacted to the
word Negro with Nazi or SS; when one knows the emo-
tional meaning of the SS image, one recognizes that the
difference from the other answers is negligible. Let me
add that some Europeans helped me by giving the test to
their acquaintances: In such cases the proportion went up
notably. From this result one must acknowledge the ef-
fect of my being a Negro: Unconsciously there was a
certain reticence.25
In Black Skin White Masks, Fanon suggests that blacks are taught
what it means to be black at a very early age.2 6 Even before black Amer-
icans begin to fully interact with the world, they have seen magazines,
heard nursery rhymes, and seen history texts with representations of
blacks in society, which create in their minds a unique group identity as a
"black person."' 27 This identity reflects that "the Wolf, the Devil, the
Evil Spirit, the Bad Man, [and], the Savage are always symbolized by
Negroes. '28 At its core, this identity reflects black Americans striving to
be recognized as fully human.29 Black Americans are "connected" in
25 Id. at 166-67. There is considerable support for the notion that anti-black stereotyping
remains widespread in society. See generally PAUL M. SNIDERMAN & EDWARD G. CARMINES,
REACHING BEYOND RACE 63-64 (1997) (describing how some Americans negatively charac-
terize black Americans); JAMES WALLER, FACE TO FACE: THE CHANGING STATE OF RACISM
ACROSS AMERICA 28-42 (1998) (making note of various stereotypes associated with black
Americans); Lawrence D. Bobo, Racial Attitudes and Relations at the Close of the Twentieth
Century, in I AMERICA BECOMING, supra note 2, 264, 273-80; Craig St. John & Tamara
Heald-Moore, Fear of Black Strangers, 24 Soc. Sci. RES. 262, 278-79 (1995). Claude Steele
has done extensive work on what he has coined the "stereotype threat" or, in the context of
African American students, negative stereotypes that are prevalent in society, e.g., the belief
that blacks test poorly, a stereotype that can be extremely harmful and can negatively affect
student academic success. See, e.g., Claude M. Steele & Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat
and the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 797, 797 (1995).
26 See FANON, supra note 11, at 148.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 146.
29 When I use the term "fully human" or "absolute humanity," I am referring to the quest
to be recognized absolutely and unequivocally as a human being, and not in the relative sense.
In contrast, someone might be human in the relative sense, "to the extent that they share a
common religious, ethnic, cultural or other similarly substantial identity attribute." See Omar
Barghouti, Relative Humanity: The Fundamental Obstacle to a One State Solution, ZMAG,
Dec. 16, 2003, http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?ItemID=4696 (last visited Nov.
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that they recognize that there are negative representations and stereotypi-
cal images of black Americans floating around. At the same time, black
Americans are connected in a deeper way as they are a people fighting
for recognition of their own absolute humanity; a humanity that stands in
stark contrast to these negative representations. 30
Like Fanon, W.E.B. Du Bois understood that blacks have an iden-
tity that is based, in part, on the fact that they are African American.31
From Du Bois' perspective, how blacks are treated in this country, and
their individual and collective striving to "throw off the shackles" of a
society in which they are often figuratively invisible, are fundamental
parts of being black in America. 32 In his ground-breaking treatise, The
Souls of Black Folk, Du Bois recounted one of the first times that he
became aware that he was seen as less than human:
And yet, being a problem is a strange experience, - pe-
culiar even for one who has never been anything else,
save perhaps in babyhood and in Europe. It is in the
early days of rollicking boyhood that the revelation first
bursts upon one, all in a day, as it were. I remember
well when the shadow swept across me. I was a little
thing, away up in the hills of New England, where the
dark Housatonic winds between Hoosac and Taghkanic
to the sea. In a wee wooden schoolhouse, something put
it into the boys' and girls' heads to buy gorgeous visit-
ing-cards - ten cents a package - and exchange. The
exchange was merry, till one girl, a tall newcomer, re-
fused my card, - refused it peremptorily, with a glance.
Then it dawned upon me with a certain suddenness that I
was different from the others; or like, mayhap, in heart
29, 2008). In the latter case, one might be "entitled to only a subset of the otherwise inaliena-
ble rights that are due to 'full' humans." Id.
30 Professor Charles Lawrence discusses the effect of stereotypes or modem racism on
African Americans in his ground-breaking exploration of modem racism, in which he notes
that "[i]n a society that no longer condones overt racist attitudes and behavior, many of these
attitudes will be repressed and prevented from reaching awareness in an undisguised form" in
a way that fails to extend to blacks the status of full humanity. Charles R. Lawrence InI, The
Id, The Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV.
317, 356 (1987) (citation omitted). See generally COLORED CONTRADICTIONS: AN ANTHOL-
OGY OF CONTEMPORARY AFRCAN AMERICAN PLAYS (Harry J. Elam, Jr. & Robert Alexander
eds., 1996) (containing an anthology of plays written by African American playwrights that
demonstrate the shared black experience, which is defined, in part, by living in a society in
which stereotypical representations of African Americans are omnipresent).
31 See generally W.E.B. Du Bois, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK (Candace Ward ed., Do-
ver Publications 1994) (1903) (discussing how the collective identity of black Americans
comes both from the struggles their forefathers faced in Africa and the current struggles of
black people in America).
32 See id.
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and life and longing, but shut out from their world by a
vast veil. 33
In appreciating the striving in the souls of African Americans in a
society that fails to support the humanity of African Americans, Du Bois
recognizes that there is a group identity that all black people have by
virtue of the socio-political-legal and historical environment in which
they live. Du Bois' biographer, Manning Marable, observes:
Few books make history, and fewer still become founda-
tional texts for the movements and struggles of an entire
people . . . . [T]his stunning critique of how "race" is
lived through the normal aspects of daily life is central to
what would become known as "whiteness studies" a cen-
tury later.34
Black Americans currently live in a society in which racism is a part
of their every day reality. 35 "In the course of centuries of struggle
33 Id. at 1-2. Thomas Holt has commented on Du Bois' observations of the African
American experience. See Thomas C. Holt, The Political Uses of Alienation: W.E.B. Du Bois
on Politics, Race, and Culture, 1903-1940, 42 Am. Q. 301, 304 (1990) (The question of "how
one achieves mature self-consciousness and an integrity or wholeness of self in an alienating
environment ... would become the dominant focus.., of Du Bois' life and work.") (citation
omitted).
34 MANNING MARABLE, LIvING BLACK HISTORY: How REIMAGINING THE AFRICAN-
AMERICAN PAST CAN REMAKE AMERICA'S RACIAL FUrURE 96 (2006); see also Sandra L.
Barnes, A Sociological Examination of W.E.B. Du Bois' The Souls of Black Folk, N. STAR,
Spring 2003, at 1, 1 (noting that "Du Bois' observations and findings are timeless"); Kendra
Hamilton, A Timeless Legacy: Celebrating 100 Years of W.E.B. Du Bois' The Souls of Black
Folk - A Salute to Black History Month, BLACK ISSUES IN HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 13, 2003, at 1,
available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-mODXK/is_26_19/ai_98171169/pg-l (last
visited Nov. 29, 2008). Scholars have also acknowledged the timelessness of Fanon's work.
See Morrison, supra note 12, at 63, 68 ("Frantz Fanon's view of relations between the Euro-
pean colonizer and the African colonized [is] . . . as applicable today in America as ever
...."); see also Prabhu, supra note 20, at 189 ("Frantz Fanon's writings remain one of the
most influential oeuvres from which postcolonial criticism draws. His work is referred to in
discussions on, among other things, violence, nationalism, inequality, racism, capitalism, elit-
ism, sexuality, and ethnicity in both the postcolonial nation state and various metropolitan
contexts.").
35 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Critical Legal Studies and the Realities of Race-Does the
Fundamental Contradiction Have a Corollary?, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 407, 407 (1988).
Professor Richard Delgado often writes about the role that race and racism play in everyday
life. According to Professor Delgado, one "structural feature of human experience," that sepa-
rates people of color from white people, is the daily experience of subtle racism, something
that white people rarely see, but people of color experience often. Id. at 407. Delgado sug-
gests that people of color "live in a world that is dominated by race," and when they get
together, often their conversations involve swapping stories of how racism has reared its ugly
head on that particular day. Id. at 407-08. Similarly, Professor Twila Perry opines:
Although slavery ended over one hundred years ago, Black people in this country
remain inescapably aware of the relationship between the oppression of the individ-
ual and the subordinated status of the group. Despite the elimination of de jure
segregation, many Blacks still perceive racism as an enduring part of the American
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against enslavement, cultural alienation, and the spiritual cannibalism of
white racism," 36 black Americans have acquired a cohesive identity. In
other words, black Americans have a complex reality that has a particular
socio-political-legal and historical context, and helps define how many
black Americans see the world. 37
Professor Dawson, one of the nations leading experts on race, sug-
gests that the forced segregation of the races following the Reconstruc-
tion era-enforced through "Jim Crow legislation, electoral
disenfranchisement of blacks, the protection of white racial terrorists,"
lynching, and "scientific" and "historical" justifications for racism-has
led to the development of black institutions including "political organiza-
tions, fraternal organizations, businesses, and . . . the black church." 38 It
is this "differential association," 39 including the family and other com-
munity institutions, which has contributed to the formation of a separate
landscape. Racism pervades every aspect of Black people's lives. Thus, Blacks of
every social, economic, and educational class understand that their difficulty in hail-
ing taxi cabs in our cities is more than just accidental.
Twila L. Perry, The Transracial Adoption Controversy: An Analysis of Discourse and Subordi-
nation, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 33, 50 (1994) (citations omitted).
36 Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758, 793 (1990) (quoting James
Turner, Black Nationalism: The Inevitable Response, BLACK WORLD, Jan. 1971, at 4).
37 UCLA Law Professor Devon Carbado, upon his arrival to the United States, quickly
became aware of this reality: "I was not eager, upon my arrival to the United States, to assert a
black American identity .... But I became a black American anyway .... [This identity] was
ascribed to me." Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV.
946, 948 (2002). This reality has been described, in part, by critical race theorists as a "master
narrative" of race. These theorists suggest that the only way to understand society is to under-
stand the role that race and racism play in everyday life, including in the media and legal
discourse. See Charles R. Lawrence, I1, The Message of the Verdict: A Three-Act Morality
Play Starring Clarence Thomas, Willie Smith, and Mike Tyson, in RACE, GENDER, AND POWER
IN AMERICA: THE LEGACY OF THE HILL-THOMAS HEARINGS 105, 107-17 (Anita Faye Hill &
Emma Coleman Jordan eds., 1995); see also Lisa Lowe, Heterogeneity, Hybridity, Multiplic-
ity: Marking Asian American Differences, I DIASPORA 24, 26 (1991) (discussing the role of
"master narratives" in the context of Asian American cultural identity); Margaret M. Russell,
Beyond "Sellouts" and "Race Cards": Black Attorneys and the Straightjacket of Legal Prac-
tice, 95 MICH. L. REV. 766, 773 (1997); David B. Wilkins, Straightacketing Professionalism:
A Comment on Russell, 95 MICH. L. REV. 795, 796 (1997) [hereinafter Wilkins, Straightjacket-
ing Professionalism]. In discussing the role of media discourses in sharpening tensions be-
tween black Americans and Korean Americans in the wake of the acquittal of the police
officers in the first "Rodney King" trial, Lisa Ikemoto observes: "I use 'master narrative' to
describe white supremacy's prescriptive, conflict-constructing power, which deploys exclu-
sionary concepts of race and privilege in ways that maintain intergroup conflict." See Lisa C.
Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story of Black American/Korean American
Conflict: How We Constructed "Los Angeles," 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1582 (1993) (citation
omitted); see also Wilkins, Identities and Roles, supra note 2, at 1520.
38 See MICHAEL C. DAWSON, BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN AFRICAN-AmERI-
CAN POLITICS 59-61 (1994).
39 Michael Hechter, Rational Choice Theory and the Study of Race and Ethnic Relations,
in THEORIES OF RACE AND ETrNC RELATIONS 264, 274 (John Rex & David Mason eds.,
1986). Hechter argues that "differential association" is a key aspect of identity formation,
identifying the family and other community institutions as critical in this process. Id.
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black culture40 and separate values41 among black Americans. In short,
"[t]he forced separation of the races in the South and the development of
independent black institutions [has] served to reinforce the overwhelm-
ing salience of group status and interests for individual African
Americans. 42
Race "is still a major shaper of African American lives"' 43 because it
is "a major social, economic, and political force in American society."44
One can turn to evidence of residential segregation to illustrate this point.
Scholars argue that residential segregation is still a reality for most Afri-
can Americans, which, in part, determines (1) the quality of schooling
available to blacks, (2) the amount the property of the black middle and
working classes appreciates compared to their white counterparts, (3) the
amount of wealth blacks have compared to their white counterparts, and
(4) the extent to which poverty is concentrated in black neighborhoods.45
In speaking to the salience of race in American society, and echoing
the work of Fanon and Du Bois, contemporary students of black politics
argue that "the entire class structure of black America is distorted by the
legacy of racism," 46 and that "the black middleclass is economically vul-
nerable because of its extreme reliance on public and quasi-public sector
employment. '4 7 According to Professor Dawson, "middle-class blacks
own less wealth per family than poor whites. '48 Dawson underscores
this point by noting that "[t]he median and the mean levels of household
wealth are less for black families that earn over $50,000 a year than for
white families that earn under $10,000 a year." 49
40 See DAWSON, supra note 38, at 60 (citing HOUSTON A. BAKER, JR., BLUES, IDEOLOGY,
AND AFRO-AMERICAN LITERATURE 64-112 (1984), and Henry L. Gates, Jr., Criticism in the
Jungle, in BLACK LITERATURE AND LITERARY THEORY 1, 64-75 (Henry L. Gates, Jr. ed.,
1984)).
41 See DAWSON, supra note 38, at 60 (citing MILTON ROKEACH, BELIEFS, ATnTUDES,
AND VALUES: A THEORY OF ORGANIZATION AND CHANGE 62-81 (1976), Milton Rokeach,
Change and Stability in American Value Systems, 1968-1971, in UNDERSTANDING HUMAN
VALUES: INDIVIDUAL & SOCIETAL 129, 135-47 (Milton Rokeach ed., 1979), and CORNEL
WEST, PROPHESY DELIVERANCE! AN AFRo-AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY CHRISTIANITY 35-36
(1982)).
42 DAWSON, supra note 38, at 60.
43 Id. at 7.
44 Id.
45 See id.
46 Id. (citing THOMAS D. BOSTON, RACE, CLASS, AND CONSERVATISM (1988)).
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 Id.; see also Melvin L. Oliver & Thomas M. Shapiro, Race and Wealth, 17 REV.
BLACK POL. ECON. 5, 11-12 (1989) (noting that the mean and median levels of net worth and
net financial assets of blacks earning between $30,000 and $44,999 is less than the mean and
median levels of net worth and net financial assets of whites earning between $7,500 and
$14,999).
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Dawson is careful to acknowledge that individuals have multiple
social identities, such as race, class, gender, and religion, and that schol-
ars and activists have long debated which identity is the most important
factor in determining the social status of African Americans. 50 Thus,
Dawson accounts for these social identities in his analysis of the impor-
tance of race to African Americans. Dawson observes that both histori-
cally and currently, black racial identity has overwhelmed other salient
identities and concludes that individual identity and the resulting prefer-
ences of African Americans are often significantly shaped by "race in a
society structured by a racial hierarchy. '51
In short, racial identity is uniquely salient for many African
Americans.
B. Black American Group Identity and Trust
Lawyers are often entrusted with protecting others. Some lawyers,
especially those working for non-profit legal services organizations, re-
present black Americans in their cases against institutions that have been,
and are currently perceived as being, discriminatory towards black
Americans, such as government agencies and the criminal justice sys-
tem.52 In their cases against these institutions, clients often allege or
believe racism or discrimination played a role in their treatment. Simi-
larly, they often believe that their race will factor into how they will be
treated throughout the process of obtaining relief and will factor into
what relief may be available to them. Under these circumstances, many
50 See DAWSON, supra note 38, at 46; see also Richard L. Allen et al., A Schema-Based
Approach to Modeling an African-American Racial Belief System, 83 Am. POL. SCL REv. 421
(1989) (noting that religion is an important force in shaping African American identity).
51 DAWSON, supra note 38, at 47.
52 The widespread perception among blacks that the criminal justice system is stacked
against them is well-known and discussed later in this Article. See infra Part III.A. Consider a
report that concluded that unequal treatment of blacks characterizes every step of the criminal
justice process, and that there is a "widely-held belief among black and Hispanic Americans
that the criminal justice system is deserving of neither trust nor support." See LEADERSHIP
CONFERENCE ON CIvIL RIGHTS & LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE EDUC. FUND, JUSTICE ON TRIAL:
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM I, http://www.civilrights.
org/publications/reports/cj/justice.pdf (discussing the discriminatory treatment black Ameri-
cans have faced in the criminal justice system and noting that examples of such treatment are
racial profiling, disproportionate levels of prosecution, and racially disparate sentencing); see
also J. Douglas Allen-Taylor, BUSD Settles Discrimination Lawsuit, BERKELEY DAILY
PLANET, Mar. 18, 2005, http://www.berkeleydailyplanet.comarticle.cfm?archiveDate=03-18-
05&storylD=20960 (last visited Nov. 29, 2008) (discussing the settlement of a lawsuit that
alleged a school district discriminated against black American and Latino students by expel-
ling the students without due process); Rebekah Denn, Blacks Are Disciplined at Far Higher
Rates than Other Students, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER REPORTER, Mar. 15, 2002, availa-
ble at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/disciplinegap/61940_newdiscipline12.shtml (last visited
Nov. 29, 2008); Christian Morrow, Middle-School Discipline Fails African-American Kids,
PrrrSBuRG COURIER, Feb. 28, 2006, available at http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view
_article.html?articleid=c4aba556a37a947cc8018f945fc378cf (last visited Nov. 29, 2008).
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blacks would likely want their case in the hands of someone who sees the
world as they do, someone who can personally identify with their histori-
cal and current struggle in this country as black Americans, and someone
who may be less likely to judge them because they are black.53 In short,
many blacks would want their case in the hands of an African American
attorney.
Black group identity includes a particular sensitivity to issues of
racism and oppression,54 making it more likely that black clients will
initially assume that a black lawyer is intrinsically "on their side" and is
down to "fight for them." In addition, black clients are more likely to
believe that a black lawyer is less likely to judge them based on the color
of their skin, the way that they walk, or the way that they talk.
Many black Americans have heard stories passed down from gener-
ation to generation, by a grandfather, uncle, or parent, about the racism
their forefathers faced. These stories have been used as a means to
strengthen blacks' resistance to such racism. This common experience,
both communicated and lived, makes it more likely that black lawyers
will be able to gain the trust of their black clients. In other words, this
experience makes it more likely that black clients will assume that black
lawyers understand their culture in both deep and superficial ways and
see the world as they do, are part of the same historical and current strug-
gle, and will be less likely to judge their character traits that are uniquely
black. 55
53 This is not to say that there are not certain black Americans who may prefer lawyers
who are not black. My contention, though, is that these black Americans are in the minority.
See discussion infra Part IV.
54 See, e.g., Sharron M. Singleton-Bowie, The Effect of Mental Health Practitioners'
Racial Sensitivity on African Americans' Perception of Service, in MULTICULTURAL ISSUES IN
SOCIAL WORK 491, 492 (Patricia L. Ewalt et al., eds., 1996); discussion supra Part I.D.
55 See Jacqueline Jordan Irvine, Beyond Role Models: An Examination of Cultural Influ-
ences on the Pedagogical Perspectives of Black Teachers, 66 PEABODY J. EDUC. 51, 51 (1989).
Professor Irvine suggests that the decline in success of black American students or, more
specifically, their "increasing alienation and school failure ... is . . . directly related to the
decline" of black American teachers, who "bring to the classroom unique, culturally based
pedagogical approaches that are often compatible with the learning needs of their minority
students." Id. at 5 1. She suggests that black teachers are "cultural translators and intercessors
for black students" and that "[b]lack teachers are more likely to understand Black students'
personal style of presentation as well as their language." Id. Professor Irvine also notes that
black teachers "frequently exhibit a teaching style that attends to cultural differences in per-
ceptions of authority .... " Id. While there is scant research done on the importance of black
American lawyers serving black clients, many of Professor Irvine's conclusions are transfera-
ble to the context of the attorney-client relationship. In both contexts, the issue is fundamen-
tally one of communication and trust, whether it is the lawyer understanding the client's
cultural manifestations in the same way that a teacher must understand a student if there is to
be effective communication, or a client trusting that a lawyer will not judge him because of his
cultural traits in the same way that a student must feel "safe" if she is to have the most effec-
tive learning experience.
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The culture of black Americans is often "misunderstood, ignored,
denigrated or discounted," 56 resulting in cultural alienation and miscom-
munication.5 7 Black people's "style of walking, glances, dress, and hair-
cuts,"5 8 has historically engendered fear in those who find it foreign,
unfamiliar, or uncivilized. Attorneys who see these styles as part of their
culture, or understand where these styles come from, are less likely to
find them foreign, unfamiliar, or uncivilized. 59 Attorneys who see these
cultural traits as part of their culture (a culture that has developed both in
response to and independent of the dominant culture in this country) will
be able to identify with these traits-and will be less likely to judge their
clients who possess these traits.
Similarly, black culture includes verbal and non-verbal communica-
tion, which contains rhythm, pacing, and inflection of speech, as well as
assumptions about what should be "spoken and left unspoken."' 60 Histor-
ically, the non-verbal communication of black people, as well as the
rhythm, pacing, and inflection of speech used by some black people, has
been a basis for stereotyping black people as uncivilized or uneducated,
instead of being recognized for what it is-part of a culture that has
developed both in response to and independent of a dominant culture that
has historically oppressed black people and tried to define black people
on its own terms.6 1 As with other elements of black culture, the commu-
56 Id. at 56. In her acclaimed book on hip-hop music, Professor Perry engages in an
analysis of this music genre, which she describes as black American music, and observes, "Hip
hop has, at various times, served as fodder for conservative and racially biased agendas, but it
nonetheless continues to maintain a core of artistic integrity and has grown enormously as an
art form over the years it has been under attack." IMAi PERRY, PROPHETS OF THE HOOD:
PoLrIcs & POETIcs IN Hip Hop 3 (2004). Perry argues that rap music, a popular genre of
music for African Americans, which can be traced back to West Africa, is commonly misun-
derstood and denigrated notwithstanding its artistic integrity and value as an art form.
57 See Irvine, supra note 55, at 56.
58 Id.
59 See id. See generally N. Jeremi Duru, The Central Park Five, the Scottsboro Boys,
and the Myth of the Bestial Black Man, 25 CARDozo L. REV. 1315 (2004) (discussing the
longstanding fear of the black man in America as he is portrayed as savage, animalistic, sexu-
ally unrestrained, and inherently criminal). There are, of course, black attorneys who would
view their clients as "foreign, unfamiliar, or uncivilized" due to internalized racism within the
black community. This, however, is the exception rather than the rule. See generally WiL-
LIAM E. CROSS, JR., SHADES OF BLACK: DIVERSITY IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN IDENTITY (1991)
(exploring the relationship between racial identity and internalized racism in African Ameri-
cans and using the term self-hatred instead of internalized racism); Paul Butler, Racially Based
Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 694 (1995)
("[I]ntemalized racism [may cause] some African-Americans to devalue black lives .... ");
Beverly A. Greene, Heterosexism and Internalized Racism Among African Americans: The
Connections and Considerations for African American Lesbians and Bisexual Women: A
Clinical Psychological Perspective, 54 RUTGERS L. REV. 931 (2002) (discussing how internal-
ized racism leads to conflict between members of the black American community).
60 Irvine, supra note 55, at 56-57.
61 See id. In his review of Gynnar Myrdal's American Dilemma: The Negro Problem in
Modern Democracy, (1944), Ralph Ellison notes that black American culture has been formed
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nication of black people is not monolithic, but instead, reflects who they
are as individuals, from the protagonist described in Richard Wright's
Black Boy6 2 to the protagonist in Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man,63 from a
black student at the State University of New York College at Oneonta64
to a brilliant law student who will follow in the footsteps of Charles
Hamilton Houston or Thurgood Marshall. At the same time, the commu-
nication of black people, whether a head nod or a unique display of body
language, reflects a certain culture that is associated with being African
American. 65 African American lawyers who understand the context in
which African American cultural manifestations exist and are less likely
to judge them are in a unique position to gain the trust that is necessary
for an effective attorney-client relationship. 66
The importance of an ethnic match between practitioner and client
has been recognized in previous scholarship.67 It has also been recog-
nized in practice; a recently published Child Welfare Law Office Guide-
both as the consequence of a rejection of the dominant culture and independent of the domi-
nant culture: "'Much of Negro culture might be negative, but there is also much of great value,
or richness, which, because it has been secreted by living and has made their lives more mean-
ingful, Negroes will not willingly disregard.'" Rhett S. Jones, Community and Commentators:
Black Theatre and Its Critics, 14 BLACK AM. Lrr. F. 69, 72 (1980) (quoting RALPH ELLISON,
An American Dilemma: A Review, in SHADOW & ACT 303, 316 (1964)).
62 See generally WRIGHT, supra note 10 (telling the story of a black youth coming of age
in the Jim Crow south).
63 See generally ELLISON, supra note 10 (chronicling the travels of a young black man as
he searches for his place in an America that is culturally intolerant).
64 See Brown v. Oneonta, 195 F.3d 111, 116 (2d Cir. 1999).
65 See generally Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law,
and a Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YALE L.J. 1329 (1991). Professor Mat-
suda explains that traces of everyone's life are woven into their manner of speech. See id. at
1329. She makes the point that people are inseparable from their accents. See id. Professor
Matsuda's analysis supports the argument that who people are, including their race and cul-
ture, is reflected in their speech patterns. Scholars have also discussed the specific means of
communication of African Americans. See generally MICHAEL L. HECHT ET AL., AFRICAN
AMERICAN COMMUNICATION: EXPLORING IDENTITY AND CULTURE (2003) ("AMCAN AMERI-
CAN COMMUNICATION"). In AFRICAN AMERICAN COMMUNICATION, the authors introduce their
book as follows:
What is African American Communication? Perhaps the answer to this question is best illus-
trated by sociolinguist Richard Wright, who routinely asks his class the following rhetorical
question: "If communication can be defined as the universe of forms, processes, and structures
that govern how we relate to the world, then aren't there forms, processes, and structures that
are particular to African Americans?" Indeed, there is a universe that facilitates how African
Americans relate to the world, and it is referenced by African American cultural personhood.
Id. at 1.
66 See HECHT Er AL., supra note 65, at I (explaining that African Americans have a
shared set of cultural realities).
67 See, e.g., Stanley Sue, In Search of Cultural Competence in Psychotherapy and Coun-
seling, 53 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 440, 443 (1998) (finding a significant relationship between eth-
nic match and treatment outcomes). While the psychotherapist-client relationship is distinct
from the attorney-client relationship, the issues of rapport and alliance are similarly important
to the attorney-client relationship and, thus, the findings of this article are applicable here.
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book, produced by the National Association of Counsel for Children as a
"Best Practice Guide" for attorneys representing children in abuse, neg-
lect, and dependency cases, emphasizes the importance of ethnic match
in legal representation:
A client's perception of a staff member may be directly
affected by one's external cultural markers. For exam-
ple, a client may be reluctant to work with someone of a
different race or ethnicity because of a previous negative
experience. This reluctance may manifest itself through
the client's behavior (i.e., being chronically late or miss-
ing appointments). A client may directly express dis-
comfort, but will most likely present non-verbal cues.
One's ability to identify and adequately address these is-
sues will be critical to the success of engaging and work-
ing with clients. 68
As this excerpt implies, we cannot afford for race-consciousness to
be seen as an arbitrary, irrational evil, irrespective of who is taking race
into consideration and regardless of the context in which it is being
used.69 People who view race-consciousness as arbitrary and irrational
fail to appreciate the various contexts of race.70 Race is a central basis
for understanding the significance of various social relations.
The significance of race must be considered when legal services
organizations think about the racial and ethnic compositions of their legal
staffs. In short, when considering the racial and ethnic compositions of
their organizations and their African American clients, legal services or-
ganizations should take into account the group identity of blacks which is
a product of the black socio-political-legal and historical experience in
this country. This group identity makes it more likely that a black client
will assume that a black lawyer understands her culture in both deep and
superficial ways, is part of the same historical and current struggle, and
will be less likely to judge her character traits that are uniquely black. In
sum, as further illustrated by the empirical evidence below, the existence
of a black group identity makes it more likely that a black attorney will
be able to gain a black client's trust.
68 Shannan Wilber & Ron Gutierrez, Legal Services for Children, Inc., Cultural Compe-
tence: A Child Welfare Law Office Should Deliver Culturally Competent Services, in Child
Welfare Law Office Guidebook: Best Practice Guidelines for Organizational Legal Represen-
tation of Children in Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Cases 31, 32 (Nat'l Ass'n of Counsel
for Children ed., 2006).
69 See Peller, supra note 36, at 759.
70 See id. at 759-60.
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C. Empirical Evidence from the Legal Arena
In a survey regarding desired character traits for their attorney, cli-
ents cited trustworthiness as the most important. 71 In a seminal article in
this area, "'I Want a Black Lawyer to Represent Me': Addressing a
Black Defendant's Concerns with Being Assigned a White Court-Ap-
pointed Lawyer," Kenneth P. Troccoli addresses the preference that
black defendants in the criminal justice system often have for black law-
yers-a preference that is often based on trust and mutual
understanding. 72
Troccoli begins the article by offering three reasons why black de-
fendants may have concerns about having a white court-appointed law-
yer. These concerns address the issues of "racism, attorney
effectiveness, and the practical difficulties in educating the white lawyer
on the impact race has on the defendant's case."'73 First, Troccoli sug-
gests that black defendants may not be comfortable with white lawyers
because of their belief that their white court-appointed lawyer is racist.7 4
Second, Troccoli suggests that white lawyers cannot fully understand or
appreciate what it means to be black in America (and thereby miss a
large part of the client's story and problem). 75 Lastly, Troccoli suggests
that even if white lawyers could be as effective as their black counter-
parts, getting white lawyers "up-to-speed" would require more time and
effort than the typical black defendants has.76
Troccoli relies primarily on a survey of all staff and managing attor-
neys within the Civil Division of the Legal Aid Society for the City of
New York published in 2000.77 The survey involved both personal inter-
views and a written survey. When the personal interviews were con-
ducted, every attempt was made to match the race and the gender of the
attorney and interviewer.78 The survey consisted of sixty-four questions
in six categories, one of which was "Issues of Race and the Clients. '79
71 See Carolyn Copps Hartley & Carrie J. Petrucci, Practicing Culturally Competent
Therapeutic Jurisprudence: A Collaboration Between Social Work and Law, 14 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL'Y 133, 133 (2004).
72 See Troccoli, supra note 6, at 36.
73 Id. at 5. Troccoli discusses reasons that black defendants might have problems with
white court-appointed lawyers for reasons other than their race (e.g., the client may perceive
the attorney as part of "the system"). Id. at 17-26. While these may be relevant to the attor-
ney-client relationship, they are outside the scope of this Article and I do not address them at
length here.
74 See id. at 17.
75 See id. at 25.
76 See id.
77 Troccoli relies on the survey discussed in Acevedo's article. Id. at 3 n.5; see also
Acevedo et al., supra note 4, at 4.
78 See Acevedo et al., supra note 4, at 24.
79 See id. at 25.
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The results indicate that white lawyers and black lawyers have very
different ideas regarding the significance of race to the attorney-client
relationship. From the perspective of the black attorneys (and attorneys
of color generally), clients typically prefer an attorney who is of the same
race.80 To the question: "Do you believe your clients take the race of
their attorney into consideration?," most of the attorneys of color an-
swered "yes," while most of the white attorneys answered "no."81 In her
written response to this question, a Latina attorney wrote, "I believe that
clients feel more comfortable with individuals 'like them.'"82 A Latino
attorney wrote, "I sense a certain degree of apprehension and confusion
when the attorney of record lacks the necessary sensitivity with minority
clients. Those clients see the attorney ... as just one more peg in the
white machinery of government." 83 Finally, an African American attor-
ney noted "that clients often make assumptions about the ability of their
lawyer to identify with their concerns based on whether or not their attor-
ney is of the same race." 84
Similarly, a former clinical professor at the University of Michigan,
Clark Cunningham, who is white, recounts a poignant story of a black
defendant's skepticism of-and inability to trust-his white lawyers.85
While at Michigan in the 1990s, Cunningham supervised two white male
students who were appointed to represent a black male named Dujon
Johnson.86 According to Cunningham, state troopers stopped Johnson at
a gas station and accused him of running a red light.87 Johnson immedi-
ately questioned whether the stop and search was lawful.88 Notwith-
standing his protestations, Johnson was given two citations (neither
having to do with running a red light): one for driving with a suspended
license and one for disorderly conduct. 89
The report filed by the state troopers indicated that Johnson stated
that the charges were false and that the officers were only charging him
because of the color of his skin. 90 In the initial interview with the Michi-
gan law students, however, Johnson did not mention that he thought that
80 See id. at 33-46.
81 See id. at 33-34.
82 Id. at 34 (footnote omitted).
83 Id. (footnote omitted).
84 Id. (footnote omitted).
85 See Marjorie A. Silver, Emotional Competence, Multicultural Lawyering and Race, 3
FLA. COASTAL L.J. 219, 221-29 (2002) (citing Clark D. Cunningham, The Lawyer as a Trans-
lator, Representation as Text: Towards an Ethnography of Legal Discourse, 77 CORNELL L.
REv. 1298 (1992)).
86 Id. at 221.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 See Michelle S. Jacobs, People from the Footnotes: The Missing Element in Client-
Centered Counseling, 27 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 345, 363 (1997).
90 See Silver, supra note 85, at 221.
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the troopers had stopped him because he was black.91 Subsequently, in a
two-page statement of facts written by the students after the initial inter-
view with Johnson, the students failed to mention that racism could have
played a part in this case. 92
On the first day of trial, the prosecutor moved to dismiss the case
and the judge granted the motion.93 Much to Cunningham's surprise, the
dismissal brought Johnson very little relief.94 Instead, "Johnson felt the
actions of the students and Cunningham imposed upon him the same
injury that had been imposed upon him by the troopers, i.e., they had all
acted to deprive him of his right to control his life, his right to equal
respect, and his right to be treated like an adult."'95 Johnson had never
felt respected by his lawyers and had never fully been able to trust them,
resulting in him never telling them the entire story, i.e., that he thought
that race had played a role, or the deciding role in his arrest. Or, in
Johnson's words (speaking to Cunningham after the verdict):
You're the kind of person who usually does the most
harm. You have a guardian mentality, assume that you
know the answer. You presume you know the needs and
the answers. Oversensitivity. Patronizing. All the
power is vested in you. I think you may go too far, as-
suming that you would know the answer.96
In "People from the Footnotes," Professor Jacobs notes that Cun-
ningham failed to understand why Johnson did not tell the law students
that he believed the police officers had stopped him because he was
black.97 It does not appear that Cunningham even considered that their
client may not have trusted them. When Cunningham asked Johnson
why he had not explicitly raised the issue of race, Johnson said:
I did not tell you that it was a racial issue, although I
knew from the beginning that it was (my arrest) racially
motivated. I would have confided this, but who would
have believed me anyway? I felt that on the basis of law
itself that I did not have to interject the aspect of racial
bias. I knew, legally, that Kiser's [trooper] actions were
wrong. And I felt I had taken the higher moral and legal
ground. 98
91 See id. at 226.
92 See id.
93 See id. at 224.
94 See Jacobs, supra note 89, at 364.
95 Id. (footnote omitted).
96 Silver, supra note 85, at 225 (footnote omitted).
97 See Jacobs, supra note 89, at 386.
98 Id. at 386-87 (footnote omitted, emphasis added).
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While Johnson's difficulty in trusting his white lawyers seems to
have surprised Cunningham, Johnson's response is not surprising when
considered in light of social science data which suggests that white coun-
selors, as compared to black counselors, have a more difficult time gain-
ing the trust of their black clients.99 A review of social science data on
ethnic match in the clinical relationship indicates that ethnic differences
between client and counselor (e.g., a white counselor and black client),
have been related to premature termination of the counseling relation-
ship. 100 Similarly, in other studies, researchers have found that white
counselors may have difficulty gaining the trust of black students.' 01
These studies also indicate that white counselors may have a hard time
convincing black students that they will be able to help solve their
problems, or even to get them to return for a follow-up visit.102
In the context of the lawyer-client relationship, Professor Cunning-
ham eventually found that being of a different race than his client made it
a challenge to gain his client's trust. This discovery is in line with social
science data which indicates that white counselors, as compared to black
counselors, may have a more difficult time gaining the trust of their
black clients. As I discuss in the next section, empirical evidence from
the medical field also supports the notion that one's group identity, spe-
cifically black American identity, makes it more likely that black lawyers
will create an environment where their black clients can trust them.
These clients, in turn, may be more likely to trust a black lawyer than a
lawyer who is not black.
99 See e.g., C. Edward Watkins, Jr., et al., Cultural Mistrust and Its Effects on Expecta-
tional Variables in Black Client-White Counselor Relationships, 36 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL.
447, 448-49 (1989).
100 See Colleen Halliday-Boykins et al., Caregiver-Therapist Ethnic Similarity Predicts
Youth Outcomes from an Empirically Based Treatment, 73 J. CONSULTING & CLIN. PSYCHOL.
808, 814 (2005); see also Francis Terrell & Sandra Terrell, Race of Counselor, Client Sex,
Cultural Mistrust Level, and Premature Termination from Counseling Among Black Clients,
31 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 371, 373-74 (1984). While there are studies that show that eth-
nic/racial match is important, there are also studies that conclude the opposite. For example, in
one study, the authors conducted a meta-analysis of ten published and unpublished studies
between 1991 and 2001 and found no statistically significant effect of racial/ethnic match on
various variables related to the doctor patient relationship. See Sung-Man Shin et al., A Meta-
Analytic Review of Racial-Ethnic Matching for African American and Caucasian American
Clients and Clinicians, 52 J. COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 45, 47, 52 (2005). While this study con-
cludes that other factors, such as similar attitudes and values, may be more important than
ethnic match, the overwhelming majority of studies found that ethnic match is indeed impor-
tant. See id. at 52. Furthermore, the authors in this study conclude that things such as "similar
attitudes and beliefs" may be more important than ethnic match, but I suggest that similar
attitudes and beliefs, i.e., a black group identity, may, in many cases, be synonymous with
ethnic match. See id. at 52.
101 See e.g., C. Edward Watkins, Jr. & Francis Terrell, Mistrust Level and Its Effects on
Counseling Expectations in Black-White Counselor Relationships: An Analogue Study, 35 J.
COUNSELING PSYCHOL. 194, 196 (1988).
102 See id.
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D. Empirical Evidence from the Medical Field
Studies from the medical field support the notion that African
American service providers are more likely to gain the trust of their Afri-
can American clients because the providers and clients share a group
identity.103 One such study examines the level of awareness of racial
oppression of mental health practitioners in Washington, D.C., and ex-
plores how this awareness affects clients' perceptions of service deliv-
ery.10 4 The study measures three variables: (1) the sensitivity of case
managers to the "existence of racially oppressive attitudes, beliefs, and
behaviors in the mental health services system," (2) the effect that level
of sensitivity to racial oppression had on service delivery to African
American clients, and (3) how case managers' level of sensitivity to ra-
cial oppression affected clients' perceptions of quality of life. 105 The
authors found that race, gender, and degree type (e.g., a degree in social
work) influence racial oppression sensitivity, with race being the most
significant.10 6 The study also found that "moderately and highly sensi-
tive case managers are, perhaps, more attentive to the emotional and ma-
terial needs of their African American clients. '10 7 The study concluded
that "[c]ase managers who are sensitive to the dilemma faced by African
Americans in general.., are perhaps more likely to create an empathetic
103 See Singleton-Bowie, supra note 54, at 500-02 (concluding that the life experiences
of African American mental health practitioners may make them better able to create an em-
pathetic and supportive environment for their African American patients); see also COMMITrEE
ON UNDERSTANDING & ELIMINATING RACIAL & ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTHCARE, INSTI-
TUTE OF MEDICINE OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMIES, UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RA-
CIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTHCARE 13 (Brian D. Smedley et al. eds., 2003)
[hereinafter UNEQUAL TREATMENT] (explaining how a primary care provider that bridges cul-
tural gaps may make her African American patients less weary of the health care system);
Chen et al., supra note 4, at 138 (finding that African Americans who have strong beliefs
about racial discrimination prefer African American physicians and are more likely to be satis-
fied with their care when this preference is met); Gamst et al., supra note 4, at 457 (investigat-
ing the effects of client ethnicity and client-counselor ethnic match on treatment outcomes of
1,946 children and adolescent community health center clients and finding that clinical out-
comes were maximized when Latino and African American mood disorder clients were ethni-
cally matched).
104 See Singleton-Bowie, supra note 54, at 493.
105 Id.
106 See id. at 500.
107 Id. at 501. Strikingly, according to the study, insensitivity to racial oppression re-
sulted in high rates of psychiatric institutionalization among African Americans. See id.
"Even more important," the study noted, "it has been demonstrated that this insensitivity can
lead to misdiagnosis and maltreatment of a most vulnerable population." Id. Singleton-Bowie
also found that the overall low sensitivity to racial oppression contrasted with the high percent-
age of case managers of color. See id. Singleton-Bowie suggests that "this dichotomy [may
indicate] a tendency of workers to incorporate the values and the behavior of the larger society
in direct opposition to their own life experiences and personal views." Id. at 500; see also
Gamst et al., supra note 4, at 462 (discussing a study of 1,946 children and adolescent commu-
nity health center clients, which found that clinical outcomes were maximized when Latino
and African American mood disorder clients were ethnically matched).
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and supportive relationship with their African American clients while at
the same time removing barriers to services and resources." 10 8 This
study suggests that African American service providers are more likely
to create a relationship with their African American clients that facilitates
service delivery due to a higher level of racial awareness and sensitivity
on the part of the service providers. This study suggests that African
American service providers are uniquely able to create a working rela-
tionship in which their client is able to trust them.
While only a few studies have tried to analyze the connection be-
tween patients' beliefs about racism in the health care system and their
experiences in the health care system, the findings of one such study
suggest that African American clients who believe that there is discrimi-
nation in the health care system prefer African American service provid-
ers. Dr. Fredrick Chen and his colleagues conducted one of these studies
by using telephone survey data to explore the potential connection be-
tween patients' beliefs about racism within the health care system and
their preferences for a physician of the same the race. 109
Dr. Chen's study found that African Americans who believe there is
discrimination in the health care system tend to prefer an African Ameri-
can physician.110 While this study found that only 22% of African
Americans preferred to have an African American physician, it also
found that among those who preferred an African American physician,
those who had one, as compared to those who did not have one, were
more likely to rate their physician as excellent.III
One of the most well-known reports in this area is The Comprehen-
sive Report of the Institute of Medicine (IOM), which was commissioned
by Congress in 2002 to study disparities in health care.112 This report
also paints a picture of a society in which African Americans may be
more likely to trust-and prefer-service providers who know what it is
like to be a black American. In relevant part, two of the major findings
of this report were:
Racial and ethnic disparities in healthcare occur in the
context of broader historic and contemporary social and
economic inequality, and evidence of persistent racial
108 Singleton-Bowie, supra note 54, at 501.
109 See Chen et al., supra note 4, at I.
110 See id. The perception of racial discrimination in the justice system among African
Americans is discussed throughout this Article and need not be repeated at length here. But it
is worth noting that this perception makes the findings of Dr. Chen's study particularly salient.
I 11 See id. While the authors did find that African Americans overall did not appear to
prefer African American physicians, this finding is distinguishable from the legal context for a
number of reasons, including the fact that there is a widely held perception that the judicial
system in this country has historically been and is currently racist. See infra Part HI.A.
112 See UNEQUAL TREATMENT, supra note 103, at 3.
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and ethnic discrimination in many sectors of American
life." l3
Bias, stereotyping, prejudice, and clinical uncertainty on
the part of healthcare providers may contribute to racial
and ethnic disparities in healthcare.1
14
Based, in part, on the above findings, the 1OM report highlights the
importance of increasing the proportion of underrepresented groups, such
as African Americans, in the health care system.' 15 The findings of the
1OM report and its recommendations support the notion that African
American service providers are less likely to find African American cli-
ents' style of walking, dress, communication or culture unfamiliar or un-
civilized. More fundamentally, the IOM report supports the notion that a
black client will be more likely to trust-and prefer-an African Ameri-
can service provider, as the black client will likely assume that a black
service provider will understand her culture in both deep and superficial
ways, is part of the same historical and current struggle, and is less likely
to judge her character traits that are uniquely black.
Thus, empirical evidence from the medical field also supports the
notion that the socio-political-legal and historical environment of black
Americans has resulted in a black group identity, and that African Amer-
ican lawyers may better be able to gain the trust of their African Ameri-
can clients.
II. COMMUNICATION AND THE
ArrORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP
The second reason that legal services organizations should employ
African American attorneys is that African American attorneys commu-
nicate more effectively with African American clients.' 1 6
113 Id. at 19.
114 Id.
115 See id. at 14.
116 While there are exceptions to every rule, the empirical evidence (much of which is
cited here) supports this conclusion. In a 2006 meeting of leading children's rights lawyers at
the University of Nevada Las Vegas Law School, a Working Group considered the role of
race, ethnicity, and class in the attorney-client relationship, concluding:
This Working Group considered the role of race, ethnicity, and class (hereinafter
"REC") in the attorney-client relationship. Participants recognize that, in American
society, children in the child welfare and juvenile justice systems are disproportion-
ately poor and of color while the lawyers for those children and decision makers are
overwhelmingly white and middle class. This racial disparity may affect attorney
client communication, perpetuate stereotypes, foster distrust of the legal system and
contribute to bad outcomes for the affected children and families. Issues related to
the REC, which often are ignored both in the attorney client relationship and more
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A. Empirical Evidence from the Legal Arena
Kenneth P. Troccoli's article addresses the issue of communication
between an attorney and a client.1 17 In relevant part, Troccoli provides:
Those who share a common identity group factor such as
race, should feel better able to communicate their needs
and their feelings to others of the same race. Their
shared identity would facilitate understanding and allow
for more productive counseling. What little scholarship
there is in this area seems to support this theory. 18
Again, Troccoli primarily relies on a survey of all of the staff and
managing attorneys within the Civil Division of the Legal Aid Society
for the City of New York published in 2000.119
As noted earlier, the results indicate that white and black lawyers
often report very different perceptions of the significance of race to the
attorney-client relationship.12 0 While a number of questions from the
survey have been discussed above, 12' there are few that are related to
attorney-client communication and have not been mentioned. For exam-
ple, Question 44 from the survey was: "Do you believe your race has an
effect on how you represent your clients?" 122 A majority of the white
attorneys responded to this question by answering that their race has no
effect on how they represent their clients. 123 However, the majority of
the attorneys of color believed that their race has a positive effect on how
they represent their clients, indicating that they feel that sharing a racial
identity with their clients "foster[s] more meaningful communication."' 124
Question 49 asked the survey respondents if "[c]lients are more
open with attorneys of the same race as them."' 125 The answers to this
generally in the administration of justice, must be identified, confronted, and
resolved.
Report of the Working Group on the Role of Race, Ethnicity, and Class, 6 NEV. L.J. 634, 634
(2006) (emphasis added). The Working Group was composed of leading scholars and partici-
pants in the children's rights field. See id. These participants rightly recognized the impor-
tance of considering ethnic match in the context of the attorney-client relationship. It is, in
part, because of minorities' distrust of the legal system that the Working Group concluded that
issues related to the importance of race in the attorney-client relationship must be resolved.
See id.
117 See Troccoli, supra note 6, at 6.
118 Id. at 22 (citing Acevedo et al., supra note 4, at 18).
119 Troccoli relies on the survey discussed in Acevedo's article cited supra note 4. Id. at
3 n.5; see also Acevedo et al., supra note 4, at 4.
120 See Acevedo et al., supra note 4, at 33-46.
121 See supra Part I.C.
122 See Acevedo et al., supra note 4, at 37.
123 See id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 40.
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question were striking. A majority of the attorneys of color agreed with
the statement.' 26 In this case, however, only a minority of white attor-
neys disagreed with this statement, "indicating that even those who ear-
lier did not acknowledge race as an issue now seem to believe that
people of color are more open with attorneys of color." 127
B. Empirical Evidence from the Medical Field
Some of the most telling empirical evidence supporting the notion
that African American service providers, as compared to non-African
American service providers, communicate better with African American
clients, comes from the medical field. A study led by physicians at Johns
Hopkins found that when both the physician and the patient are African
American, the patients have better medical care experiences, speak
slower, are more comfortable, and are more relaxed with their physi-
cian. 128 In addition, the study found that when African American pa-
tients are matched with African American physicians, the physician visits
are more participatory.' 29
This study involved the analysis of audio-taped conversations of the
medical appointments of 252 patients (142 African Americans and 110
whites) at 16 primary care clinics in Baltimore and Washington, D.C. 130
The patients were receiving care from 31 physicians (18 African Ameri-
cans and 13 whites). The audiotapes were analyzed for length of visit,
speech patterns and overall patient satisfaction.'13 The results showed
race-concordant visits were on average two minutes longer and had a
more positive emotional tone and higher satisfaction rating than race-
discordant visits. 132
Dr. Lisa Cooper, the lead author of the study and associate professor
of medicine and health policy and management at Johns Hopkins, spoke
of the results of the study:
[P]eople tend to speak slower when they are more com-
fortable and relaxed, which could account for the longer
visit times in race-concordant visits. Even when the ver-
bal content of the visits was the same, perceptions of the
visit were more positive in race-concordant visits, sug-
gesting that patient and physician attitudes and expecta-
126 See id.
127 Id.
128 See Lisa A. Cooper et al., Patient-Centered Communication, Ratings of Care, and
Concordance of Patient and Physician Race, 139 ANN. INTERN. MED. 907, 907 (2003).
129 Id.
130 See id.
131 See id. at 908-09.
132 See id. at 910.
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tions, rather than the actual words used to communicate,
may have affected patients' experiences .... 133
Dr. Cooper continued:
Teaching communication skills to physicians is impor-
tant to improve the patient-physician relationship . ...
However, this study suggests that simply training physi-
cians to make conversation in race-discordant visits
mimic that of race-concordant visits may not be enough
to improve patients' experiences in visits with a physi-
cian of a different race. Increasing ethnic diversity
among physicians and engendering trust and comfort
between patients and physicians of different races may
be the best strategies to improve health care experiences
for members of ethnic minority groups.134
Similar (and undoubtedly related) to the findings on trust, there is
empirical evidence to support the conclusion that black lawyers are better
able to communicate with black clients. I now turn to the third reason
that legal services organizations that serve large populations of African
American clients should have African American attorneys: the percep-
tion of a judicial system that is unfair and racist, i.e., the perception of a
two-tiered system of justice.
III. THE PERCEPTION OF A Two-TIERED
SYSTEM OF JUSTICE
Since there is a widely held view that the American judicial system
was and still is racist, black clients may be less likely to think that a
black lawyer is part of that system.135 The black client will be less likely
to worry that a black lawyer will be unable to imagine what it is like to
be on the second tier of a two-tier system. In addition, the black client
133 Press Release, Johns Hopkins Medicine, Whites, African-Americans Better Rate Their
Medical Care Experiences When Seeing Same-Race Physicians (Dec. 3, 2003), http://www.
hopkinsmedicine.org/Press-releases/2003/12_03_03.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2008) (quoting
Dr. Lisa A. Cooper discussing Cooper et al., supra note 128).
134 Id. (emphasis added); see also Thomas A. Laveist & Amani Nuru-Jeter, Is Doctor-
Patient Race Concordance Associated with Greater Satisfaction with Care?, 43 J. HEALTH &
SoC. BEHAVIOR 296, 296 (2002) (examining racial/ethnic differences in patient satisfaction
among patients in multiple combinations of doctor-patient race/ethnicity pairs and finding that
respondents who were race concordant reported greater satisfaction with their physician);
Somnath Saha et al., Patient-Physician Racial Concordance and the Perceived Quality and
Use of Health Care, 159 ARcHrvEs INTERNAL MED. 997, 997 (1999) (finding that when black
patients have black physicians they are more likely to rate their physicians as excellent and
concluding that their findings "confirm the importance of racial and cultural factors in the
patient-physician relationship and reaffirm the role of black physicians in caring for black
patients").
135 See Troccoli, supra note 6, at 17; see also Bobo, supra note 25, at 280-85.
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will be less likely to worry that a black lawyer cannot understand the
circumstances that the client is in by virtue of being black in a histori-
cally racist system. This section is divided into two sub-sections. First, I
explore the historical and current widely held perception among African
Americans that the American judicial system is racist. Second, I explore
why, in light of this widely held perception, legal services organizations
will be more credible from their clients' perspective if they reflect the
racial and ethnic make-up of their populations. This latter concept has
been referred to as "external legitimacy."'1 36
A. The American "Justice" System
In The Souls of Black Folk, W.E.B Du Bois discussed the "shared
perspective of blacks" regarding the American legal system. Specifi-
cally, Du Bois opined that "the Negro is coming more and more to look
upon law and justice, not as protecting safeguards, but as sources of hu-
miliation and oppression."1 37
Du Bois describes a judicial system that was trying to adjust to a
world that it was not originally designed for, namely, a world in which
the primary purpose was not as an appendage to the system of chattel
slavery (in which the main goal was to "keep track of all negroes" and
make sure they were returned to their owner in the event of an escape or
theft of them as property), but instead was to protect society from indi-
viduals who were not abiding by the law of the land.138 The perception
of the American judicial system that Du Bois describes is eerily timeless.
In part, Du Bois explains:
For, as I have said, the police system of the South was
originally designed to keep track of all Negroes, not sim-
ply of criminals; and when the Negroes were freed and
the whole South was convinced of the impossibility of
free Negro labor, the first and almost universal device
was to use the courts as a means of reenslaving the
blacks. It was not then a question of crime, but rather
one of color, that settled a man's conviction on almost
any charge. Thus, Negroes came to look upon courts as
instruments of injustice and oppression, and upon those
convicted in them as martyrs and victims.
When, now, the real Negro criminal appeared, and in-
stead of petty stealing and vagrancy we began to have
136 Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work: Diversity, Integration, and Affirmative
Action in the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 22 (2005).
137 Du Bois, supra note 31, at 106.
138 Id. at 108.
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highway robbery, burglary, murder, and rape, there was
a curious effect on both sides the color-line: the Negroes
refused to believe the evidence of white witnesses or the
fairness of white juries, so that the greatest deterrent to
crime, the public opinion of one's own social caste, was
lost, and the criminal was looked upon as crucified
rather than hanged. On the other hand, the whites, used
to being careless as to the guilt or innocence of accused
Negroes, were swept in moments of passion beyond law,
reason, and decency. 139
While The Souls of Black Folk was written over one hundred years
ago, the collective experience of blacks today includes living in a society
in which there is the perception of a two-tiered legal system, a system in
which blacks are treated as second-class citizens. 140 For example, a 2007
Pew Research Center Survey found that while slightly more than half (55
percent) of all black Americans think that the police enforce the law
well, only 38 percent are confident that the police will refrain from using
excessive force, and only 37 percent of African Americans think that the
police treat races equally. 141 Blacks' perception of the legal system con-
trasts sharply with that of whites, as 74 percent of whites believe that the
police treat whites and blacks equally. 142 Among those who expressed a
"great deal" of confidence in the police, the differences between white
and black perceptions of the legal system are even more striking. For
139 Id. It is also worth recalling the infamous 1856 Dred Scott decision, in which Justice
Tanney pronounced that blacks were akin to white man's property and were "so far inferior,
that they had no rights which the white man was bound to respect." Dred Scott v. Sandford,
60 U.S. 393, 407 (1856).
140 See Manning Marable, Injustice Along the Color Line, BLACK ISSUES IN HIGHER
EDUC., Feb 17, 2000, at 1, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-mODXK/is-26_16/
ai_60498483 (last visited Nov. 29, 2008) ("Dred Scott is unfortunately alive and well in
America's racist Criminal Justice System."). See generally THE DARDEN DILEMMA: 12 BLACK
WRITERS ON JUSTICE, RACE, AND CONFLICTING LOYALTES (Ellis Cose ed., 1997) [hereinafter
THE DARDEN DILEMMA]. In The Darden Dilemma, Cose presents twelve essays written by
black professionals-including former prosecutors and jurists---on the American justice sys-
tem, in which many of the authors note that blacks share a perception of the American justice
system as one that doles out two-tiered justice. Id. For example, in his essay entitled, Outside
Players, syndicated columnist for the Chicago Tribune Clarence Page discusses what he de-
scribes as the somewhat "perverse" reaction that some blacks had to the not-guilty verdict in
the 0. J. Simpson case due to their perception that "it was refreshing to see that a black man
had achieved enough wealth to afford 'rich white man's justice."' Clarence Page, Outside
Players, in THE DARDEN DILEMMA, supra, at 159; see also Paul Butler, By Any Means Neces-
sary: Using Violence and Subversion to Change Unjust Law, 50 UCLA L. REv. 721, 721
(2003).
141 See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, BLACKS SEE GROWING VALUES GAP BETWEEN POOR
AND MIDDLE CLASS: OPTIMISM ABoUr BLACK PROGRESS DECLINES 37 & tbl. (2007), http://
pewsocialtrends.org/assets/pdf/Race.pdf.
142 See id.
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example, while 47 percent of whites expressed a great deal of confidence
that the police will enforce the law, only 21 percent of blacks feel this
way; 42 percent of whites expressed a great deal of confidence that the
police will avoid excessive force as compared to 11 percent of blacks;
and 42 percent of whites expressed a great deal of confidence that the
police will treat the races equally as compared to 14 percent of blacks. 143
Many cases over the years have reinforced black mistrust of the
American judicial system, including the infamous Charles Stuart case in
Boston, 44 and the Central Park Jogger 45 and Amadou Diallo cases in
New York. 146 The African American community's reaction to these
cases and the cases themselves are illustrative of the perception that the
African American community must contend with a two-tiered system of
justice.
In "The Central Park Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth of the
Bestial Black Man," Temple University law professor N. Jeremi Duru
discusses the Central Park Jogger case. In this infamous case, black
teenagers were convicted of raping a white woman in New York's Cen-
tral Park (a crime that they did not commit and for which their convic-
tions were ultimately overturned), due in large part, to the persistence of
racism and racial stereotyping in American society. 147 Professor Duru
argues that the "myth of the Bestial Black Man,"' 148 or the "myth, deeply
143 See id.; see also Bobo, supra note 25, at 281 (in a 1995 ABC News/Washington Post
poll, 88 percent of blacks indicated that the police treat them unfairly, as contrasted with 47
percent of whites); Perry, supra note 35, at 51-52 ("[R]esearch indicates that blacks and
whites have very different views about the roles of race in American life. Whites as a group
see racism as less of a problem and are more optimistic about its eradication. In the view of
many blacks, however, this society is neither colorblind nor is it in the process of being so."
(citations omitted)). Ironically, the divergence between blacks' and whites' views on police
treatment of blacks widened during the late 1980s to mid-1990s. See HOWARD SCHUMAN ET
AL., RAcIAL ATrITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND INTERPRETATIONS 265 (1997).
144 See Margaret Carlson, Presumed Innocent, TAIE, Jan. 22, 1990, at 10. In this infa-
mous case, Charles Stuart killed his wife and then shot himself in the stomach in an attempt to
cover up his crime. Id. At the time of the shootings, Stuart told the police that they had been
attacked by a black gunman and set off a whirlwind of racial tension fueled by an intense door-
to-door search for the "suspect" in the Mission Hill Neighborhood in Boston, a predominantly
black lower income neighborhood. Id. at 10-11. It was later widely acknowledged that the
Boston Police were driven by "assumptions about race and crime so powerful" that they ig-
nored holes in Stuart's account of what had happened that night. Id. at 10; see also Fox
Butterfield & Constance L. Hays, Motive Remains a Mystery in Deaths That Haunt a City,
N.Y. TimEs, Jan. 14, 1990, at Al.
145 See Duru, supra note 59 (discussing the Central Park Jogger case).
146 See Timothy Williams, City Settles Lawsuit with Diallo Family for $3 Million, Assoc.
PRESS, Jan. 6, 2004, at 1. In this infamous case, New York City police officers gunned down
Amadou Diallo, an unarmed West African immigrant, in the vestibule of his Bronx apartment,
firing 41 shots, hitting Mr. Diallo 19 times, and ultimately walked out of the courthouse free
men due to a jury clearing them of any wrongdoing in Mr. Diallo's death. Id.
147 See Duru, supra note 59, at 1320.
148 Id.
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imbedded in American culture, that black men are animalistic, sexually
unrestrained, inherently criminal, and ultimately bent on rape," 149 per-
sists today and is one of the reasons why these teenagers were convicted
despite a lack of evidence to support the conviction. 150
In this case, five teenagers from Harlem, who participated in a so-
called "wilding" spree with more than 30 young people in Central Park,
were accused of raping a white woman. 51 Four of the teenagers initially
confessed, but then immediately retracted their confessions "contending
that they had been . . . coerced."' 152 "There was no physical evidence
linking them to the crime." 153 In fact, during the trials of the youths, the
FBI DNA expert called by the prosecution testified on cross-examination
that based on their DNA tests "the semen could not have come from any
of the five defendants."' 1 4 Furthermore, FBI testimony on cross-exami-
nation indicated that only one person had ejaculated inside the victim. 55
Although the victim was unable to positively identify any of the youths,
and the forensic evidence strongly suggested that none of the youths had
taken part in the sexual assault, the prosecution continued to pursue the
case against the five teenagers. 156
A week after the youths were charged, Donald Trump "took out a
full-page ad in each of the city's four daily newspapers", and wrote, "I
want to hate these muggers and murderers. They should be forced to
suffer and, when they kill, they should be executed .... I am looking to
punish them .... I want them to be afraid."' 157 In what was ostensibly
an attempt to coerce a confession from one of the youths, Linda Fair-
stein, who worked the case as the head of the Manhattan District Attor-
ney's Sex Crimes Prosecution Unit, "bullied and stalled and blocked the
mother and two friends of one suspect, Yusef Salaam, from gaining ac-
cess to him."'158 The unfair treatment continued even though the lead
attorney for the prosecution claimed he was missing some of the neces-
sary evidence.' 59 Ultimately, the youths were convicted.160
149 Id. The "myth of the Bestial Black Man" has its origins in the very first interactions
between Africans and Europeans and was the norm during the time of American slavery. Id.
150 See id. at 1346.
151 See Sydney H. Schanberg, A Journey Through the Tangled Case of the Central Park
Jogger, VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 20-26, 2002, at 36, 37; see also Duru supra note 59, at 1316;
Chris Smith, Central Park Revisited, N.Y. MAGAZINE, Oct. 22, 2002, at 28.
152 Schanberg, supra note 151, at 37.
153 Id. at 38.
154 Id.
155 See id.
156 See id. at 39.
157 Id. at 38.
158 Id.
159 See id.
160 See id. at 38-39.
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Years later, when a convicted murderer confessed to the assault and
rape, the District Attorney's office re-examined the inconsistencies in the
youths' confessions and the exculpatory DNA evidence.' 61 While some
law enforcement officials and members of the press were still convinced
that the five youth were involved in the attack, the District Attorney
thought differently and moved to have the convictions vacated.' 62 In a
striking reversal of course, the office of District Attorney Robert Mor-
genthau noted the "extraordinary circumstances" of this case and wrote:
[A] comparison of the statements reveals troubling dis-
crepancies . . . . [T]he accounts given by the five de-
fendants differed from one another on the specific details
of virtually every major aspect of the crime-who initi-
ated the attack, who knocked the victim down, who un-
dressed her, who struck her, who held her, who raped
her, what weapons were used in the course of the assault,
and when in the sequence of events the attack took
place ....
[I]n many other respects the defendants' statements were not cor-
roborated by, consistent with, or explanatory of objective, independent
evidence. And some of what they said was simply contrary to estab-
lished fact. 163
While the nation was consumed with this case, a thirty-eight year-
old black woman was forced onto a roof and raped by two white men.164
The men then threw her off of the roof to her death. 165 The New York
Times published more than 150 articles on the Central Park Jogger case,
and the media continued to refer to the black boys as a "pack," inferring
a pack of wolves. 166 In contrast, there were only three stories in the New
York Times on the black woman who was raped and killed.167 The ex-
tensive coverage of the Central Park Jogger case-viewed by many as a
baseless prosecution of black men, which was based largely on stere-
otypical notions of who these men are "supposed" to be-compared with
the virtually non-existent coverage of the murder and rape of the black
161 See Duru, supra note 59, at 1315-17.
162 See id. at 1317-18.
163 Affirmation in Response to Motion to Vacate Judgment of Conviction at H 86 & 91,
State v. Wise et al., Indict. No. 4762/89 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.
com/hdocs/docs/crimlnywiseetal 120502aff.pdf.
164 See Chino Wilson, Op-Ed., Central Park Jogger Case Exposes Racist Justice System,
DAILY COLLEGIAN ONLINE (Penn State), Jan. 24, 1991, at 1, available at http://www.collegian.
psu.edu/archive/1991/01/01-24-91tdc/01-24-91dops-column-01.asp (last visited Nov. 29,
2008).
165 See id. at 2.
166 See id.
167 See id.
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woman, exemplifies the two-tiered justice system that exists in the
United States. 168
Another infamous judicial decision that captures what many African
Americans perceive as a two-tiered judicial system in this country is the
case of Brown v. Oneonta. 169 Oneonta involved a series of events that
occurred in Oneonta, a small town in upstate New York. 170 At the time,
Oneonta had approximately 10,000 full-time residents.'7 1 In addition,
about 7,500 students resided at the State University of New York College
at Oneonta (SUCO).172 Oneonta was a very white town-fewer than
300 blacks lived there and only two percent of SUCO students were
black.173 "On September 4, 1992, just before 2:00 a.m., someone broke
into a house just outside Oneonta and attacked a seventy-seven-year-old
white woman."'174 The woman told police that she never saw the at-
tacker's face, but that based on her view of his hand and forearm, he was
black.' 75 She said that he appeared to be young because he crossed the
room quickly. 176 She also told police that her assailant cut his hand with
a knife during the struggle. 177 After the assailant fled, a police canine
unit tracked the alleged assailant's scent toward the SUCO campus, "but
lost the trail after several hundred yards."' 178
The police immediately "attempted to locate and question every
black male student at SUCO.' 179 This "sweep" of all black male stu-
dents at SUCO produced no suspects.' 8 0 Over the next several days, the
local police (assisted by the New York State Police) conducted a sweep
of the entire town of Oneonta, stopping and questioning blacks on the
streets and inspecting their hands for cuts. 181 More than two hundred
people were questioned, but the police failed to find the alleged assail-
ant. 18 2 Black American boys waiting for the bus were stopped and inter-
rogated.'8 3 Blacks were stopped in their cars and interrogated.18 4
168 See id. at 3.
169 195 F.3d I II (2d Cir. 1999).
170 See id. at 116.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 See id.
181 See id; see also Bob Herbert, In America; Breathing While Black, N.Y. TENs, Nov. 4,
1999, at A29.
182 Oneonta, 195 F.3d at 116.
183 See id; see also MARABLE, supra note 34, at 1.
184 See Oneonta, 195 F.3d at 116; see also Marable, supra note 140, at 1.
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In early 1993, the SUCO students, along with others who were
questioned during the sweep of Oneonta (plaintiffs), filed an action in the
Southern District of New York against the City of Oneonta, the State of
New York, SUCO, certain SUCO officials, and various police depart-
ments and police officers (defendants). 185 The plaintiffs filed suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that the defendants violated their civil rights
by singling out blacks in their sweep of Oneonta. 86
Civil liberties groups were outraged by the sweep of Oneonta. 187
The state's governor, Mario Cuomo, publicly apologized for the offi-
cials' misconduct. 188 The District Court for the Southern District of New
York then dismissed some of the plaintiffs' claims and granted summary
judgment to the defendants on the others.' 89 The plaintiffs appealed the
judgment of the District Court to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit.' 90 The Second Circuit affirmed the decision of the
District Court and found "'that police officers in Oneonta, N.Y., did not
violate the Constitution when they tried to stop every black man in town
in 1992 after a woman said she had been robbed in her home by a young
black man.' "191
The Oneonta decision sent a message to many black Americans that
"neither their rights as citizens nor their humanity mattered."'192 To
many black Americans this situation was just more of the same and was
representative of the indiscriminate searches of blacks that occur every
day in this country.' 93 For some black Americans, the Oneonta decision
evoked thoughts of Dred Scott194 and proved that black Americans still
185 Oneonta, 195 F.3d at 116.
186 Id. Section 1983 allows individuals to sue state actors in federal courts for civil rights
violations. Interestingly, Section 1983 is part of what was originally referred to as The Civil
Rights Act of 1871, or the "Ku Klux Klan Act," which was enacted, in part, to provide blacks
redress-i.e., access to federal court-for violations of their civil rights by Klansmen and
complicit local and state officials, who, at best, did nothing to stop violence against blacks.
Scholars and lawyers have written extensively on Section 1983. See Martin A. Schwartz,
Fundamentals of Section 1983 Litigation, in 2 1ST ANNUAL SECTION 1983 Civr RIGrs Lrr-
GATION 41 (Hon. George C. Pratt & Martin A. Schwartz eds., 2005). See generally Gloria
Jean Rottell, Paying the Price: Its Time to Hold Municipalities Liable for Punitive Damages
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 10 J.L. & POL'Y 189, 189 (2001) (describing various § 1983 actions).
187 See Marable, supra note 140, at 1.
188 See id.
189 See Oneonta, 195 F.3d at 118. While not all of plaintiffs' claims were either dis-
missed or lost via summary judgment, the remaining claims were immaterial as the parties
stipulated to the discontinuance or dismissal of these claims with an eye towards securing an
appealable final judgment. The judgment was then appealed to the Second Circuit. See id.
190 See id. at 111.
191 Herbert, supra note 181, at A29 (quoting but failing to cite a previous New York Times
story); see also Oneonta, 195 F.3d at 123.
192 Id.
193 See Marable, supra note 140, at 1.
194 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
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"had no rights which the white man was bound to respect." 195 For many
black Americans, this was undoubtedly another illustration of a two-
tiered American judicial system in which blacks are on the second tier.
The verdict in the infamous Rodney King case had a similar impact
on black Americans. Local and national surveys taken shortly after the
1992 jury verdict that exonerated the white police officers showed that
while both whites and blacks disapproved of the verdict, only blacks held
a general perception that the criminal justice system is biased against
blacks.196 This perception of a double standard of justice offends a fun-
damental sense of fairness for black Americans.1 97 As Professor
Katheryn Russell-Brown observes:
For African Americans, a communal sense of fairness
flows directly from the groups' common history and
shared space. The belief in fairness is not only a state-
ment that Blacks have rights, too; it acknowledges that
Blacks have and continue to experience a double stan-
dard of justice. African Americans take note of their
personal experiences within the justice system and the
experiences of other African Americans-friends, fam-
ily members, acquaintances, colleagues, strangers, and
Blacks in the news. Black sensitivity to racial injustices
within the justice system is heightened by the fact that
many Blacks stand within one or two degrees of some-
one-sibling, parent, child, cousin, or friend-who is in
prison or in some way caught in the justice system (e.g.,
parole or probation). Further, Blacks also consider what
role racial bias plays in criminal and non-criminal cases
involving Blacks, compared with Whites. 198
Since there is such a widely held view among black Americans that
the American judicial system was and still is racist, 199 black Americans
are more likely to trust black lawyers to guide them through what they
perceive to be a hostile system. As mentioned above, black Americans
195 Id. at 407; see also Herbert, supra note 181, at A29 (describing the events surrounding
the Oneonta decision).
196 See Bobo, supra note 25, at 282-83.
197 See KATHERYN RUSSELL-BROWN, PROTECTING OUR OWN: RACE, CRIME, AND AFRI-
CAN AMERIcANS 35 (2006).
198 Id. (footnote omitted). See generally ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBrrRARY JUSTICE: THE
POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR (2007) (discussing reforms that will help eliminate the
racial disparities in the criminal justice system).
199 Professor Kenneth Nunn argues that African Americans have a moral obligation not to
prosecute crimes, as the criminal justice system reflects racial disparities at all levels, is "one
of the most racist institutions in the United States," and is "oppressive to African American
people." Kenneth B. Nunn, The "Darden Dilemma": Should African Americans Prosecute
Crimes?, 68 FoRDHAM L. REV. 1473, 1478-80 (2000).
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may be less likely to worry that a black lawyer is part of that system, less
likely to worry that a black lawyer will be unable to imagine what it is
like to be on the second tier of a two-tier system, and less likely to worry
that a black lawyer cannot understand the circumstances that the client is
in as a black American in a historically racist system.
B. External Legitimacy
Because African Americans believe that the American judicial sys-
tem is racist, the legitimacy of organizations that serve African Ameri-
cans in the American judicial system is of utmost importance. If these
organizations reflect the racial and ethnic make-up of the populations
that they serve, African American clients are more likely to consider
these organizations credible and legitimate.
Professor Cynthia Estlund refers to this idea (the need for organiza-
tions to reflect the population they serve) as "external legitimacy. ' 200
External legitimacy has been referenced by courts and scholars alike,
especially in the context of organizations operating within the criminal
justice system.20 1 For example, in Petit v. City of Chicago,20 2 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was faced with a § 1983
equal protection challenge against the City of Chicago, where the plain-
tiffs alleged that the city unlawfully discriminated against white police
officer applicants by implementing an affirmative action plan for African
American and Hispanic officers.20 3 Relying on Grutter v. Bollinger (the
Supreme Court holding that the University of Michigan Law School's
narrowly tailored, race-based admissions program did not violate the
Equal Protection Clause),20 4 the Seventh Circuit upheld the program as
necessary for the effective operation of the police department. 20 5 The
Seventh Circuit reasoned that a more diverse police force in a racially
and ethnically diverse city would enhance the public's perception of the
department, which, in turn, would enhance the department's ability to
200 See Estlund, supra note 136, at 22.
201 Numerous scholars have explored the concept of "external legitimacy" in the context
of African Americans and the legal system. See Roscoe C. Howard, Changing the System
from Within: An Essay Calling on More African Americans to Consider Being Prosecutors, 6
WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 139, 165-66 (2000); see also Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Judging the Judges:
Racial Diversity, Impartiality and Representation on State Trial Courts, 39 B.C. L. REv. 95,
101 (1997) ("[T]he absence of minority judges on state trial courts contributes to an atmos-
phere of racial exclusion which, at the very least, marginalizes African American lawyers,
litigants and courtroom personnel in many jurisdictions."); Bryan A. Stevenson, Confronting
Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fairness to Collateral Review of Criminal Cases, 41 HAgv.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 339, 365-66 (2006).
202 Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d I I 11 (2003).
203 Id. at 111.
204 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
205 See Petit, 352 F.3d at 1118.
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police crime. 20 6 The Court recognized that the department would be
more likely to gain the trust of the community if it had "'ambassadors' to
the community of the same [race or] ethnicity. ' 20 7 In relevant part, the
Court concluded:
It seems to us that there is [a] . . . compelling need for
diversity in a large metropolitan police force charged
with protecting a racially and ethnically divided major
American city like Chicago. Under the Grutter stan-
dards, we hold, the City of Chicago has set out a com-
pelling operational need for a diverse police
department.20 8
Scholars have recognized that the "external legitimacy" of the
American justice system depends, in part, on African Americans becom-
ing a visible part of this system. 209 For example, in "Changing the Sys-
tem from Within: An Essay Calling on More African Americans to
Consider Being Prosecutors," Roscoe Howard argues that many African
Americans believe "a fair trial does not appear attainable" in the current
system.210 Howard argues that when African Americans "becom[e] part
of the system," it will have more legitimacy in the community, and will
be "more responsive to the demands for justice. '211 Howard explains:
Minority participation provides, at the very least, an ap-
pearance of fairness. If individuals face a system that
shows no reflection of who they are, their race, their cul-
ture or their neighborhood, it is difficult to insist on their
respect for the system. I have argued before that diver-
sity in our criminal justice system is needed to provide
the trust in the system that is required for its operation.
Black and other minority faces at the government's table
in the courtroom should provide some comfort that
whatever charging decisions have been made, they have
not been made strictly on account of race.
In short, appearance is important because the community must have
some comfort that the system-and the organizations within the sys-
tem-work the same for all. 2 12
206 See id. at 1114-15.
207 Id. at 1115 (quoting Reynolds v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 2002)).
208 Id. at 1114.
209 See Howard, supra note 201, at 165-66; see also Stevenson, supra note 201, at
365-66.
210 Howard, supra note 201, at 142.
211 Id. But see Nunn, supra note 199, at 1477-78 (arguing that African Americans have a
moral obligation not to be prosecutors).
212 Howard, supra note 201, at 165-66 (footnote omitted).
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While Howard's primary goal is to persuade more African Ameri-
cans to become prosecutors, he also argues for more diversity throughout
the criminal justice system.213 Professor Bryan Stevenson echoes How-
ard's concerns in, "Confronting Mass Imprisonment and Restoring Fair-
ness to Collateral Review of Criminal Cases. '214 In this article,
Professor Stevenson discusses the long history of racial bias in the ad-
ministration of criminal justice and observes that, "[t]he perception of
unfairness [of the system] is aggravated by a lack of racial diversity
among judges and prosecutors. '215 In short, the criminal justice system
lacks external legitimacy because it lacks racial diversity. Similarly, le-
gal services organizations that do not employ black attorneys lack exter-
nal legitimacy. These organizations should hire African American
attorneys in order to establish the external legitimacy which is necessary
if they are to gain their clients' trust.
IV. WHY BLACK AMERICANS MAY NOT
WANT A BLACK ATTORNEY
Some scholars have suggested that even in a two-tiered judicial sys-
tem, an African American client may not want an African American at-
torney. Notably, these occasions arise not from a desire to strengthen the
attorney-client relationship, but primarily from perceptions about the
two-tiered judicial system. These situations (a few of which I discuss
below) are exceptions to the rule and do not undermine my conclusion
that African American attorneys may provide better representation to Af-
rican American clients.
A. "The Judicial System Is Racist" Situation
As I discuss throughout the Article, there is a widespread perception
among African Americans that the American judicial system is racist.
Thus, some people argue that a black client may feel "better off with a
white lawyer precisely because racism infects the criminal justice sys-
tem. ' 21 6 The argument is that the judicial system is primarily run, devel-
oped, and constructed by whites, and a black lawyer will not be given as
much deference and respect within the system as a white lawyer.217
213 See id. at 142.
214 See Stevenson, supra note 201, at 366.
215 ld; see also Bryan W. Leach, Note, Race as Mission Critical: The Occupational Need
Rationale in Military Affirmative Action and Beyond, 113 YALE L.J. 1093, 1118 (2004)
("[T]he mere presence of African Americans in positions of leadership within the U.S. military
helps to dispel perceptions of institutional bias ...."). For a brief discussion of Leach's Note,
see infra note 258.
216 Troccoli, supra note 6, at 36.
217 See id.; see also Naomi R. Cahn, Representing Race Outside of Explicitly Racialized
Contexts, 95 MICH. L. REv. 965, 998 (1997) (noting that race plays a role in how people are
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Kenneth P. Troccoli observes, "[t]he sad fact is that the system itself, and
particular actors within it, do treat African Americans differently than
whites. For this reason, a white lawyer may be more effective than his
Black counterpart. ' 218 Similarly, David Wilkins observes, "Black cli-
ents, who bear the brunt of the legal system's racism, may find it more
difficult to secure justice if they hire a black lawyer. '2 19 Professor Mar-
garet Russell explains the struggles black attorneys face when they use
race as part of their trial strategy:
Black attorneys who raise such [issues of race] in court
often face a heavy burden of justifying either that race
really exists as an issue at all, or that they are competent
to address the topic of race in a fair and reasoned man-
ner. When Black attorneys articulate racism as a pri-
mary factor in a particular case, they may encounter
fractious demands that they "prove it," or harsh accusa-
tions that they are "playing the race card" or otherwise
engaging in unprofessional behavior .... Unlike white
attorneys, who have the relatively luxurious comfort of
invisibility and transparency in raising issues of race in
the lawyering process, Black attorneys must always
brace themselves to have their racial, professional, and
personal identities placed in issue as well. 220
Thus, because the American judicial system does not always pro-
vide a level playing field for African American attorneys, some black
clients may prefer not to have a black attorney.
perceived in the courtroom); Todd D. Peterson, Studying the Impact of Race and Ethnicity in
the Federal Courts, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 173, 178 (1996) (discussing the findings of a
report commissioned by the D.C. Circuit Task Force on Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias, and
noting that 40% of African American lawyers believed that they were at a disadvantage in a
bench trial when compared to white attorneys, while only two percent of white attorneys be-
lieved that African American litigators suffered a disadvantage).
218 Troccoli, supra note 6, at 37; see also Wilkins, Straightjacketing Professionalism,
supra note 37, at 797 ("White clients may also be less likely to engage the services of a black
lawyer if they are concerned that he or she will not be taken seriously by other important
actors in the system.").
219 Wilkins, Straightjacketing Professionalism, supra note 37, at 797.
220 Russell, supra note 37, at 771-72; see also Troccoli, supra note 6, at 37; Peggy McIn-
tosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Account of Coming to See Correspon-
dences Through Work in Women's Studies, in CRITIcAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKNo BEHIND THE
MIRROR 291, 294 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1997) (by way of illustrating the
privilege she enjoys because she is Caucasian, the author observes, "If I declare there is a
racial issue at hand, or there isn't a racial issue at hand, my race will lend me more credibility
for either position than a person of color will have.").
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B. "The White Lawyer Is a Better Lawyer" Situation
David Wilkins observes that misguided beliefs about the incompe-
tence of African American attorneys can cause them to be seen as "less
than 'real' lawyers. '221 Wilkins further observes that African American
lawyers may be treated "at best patronizingly, and at worst, as second
class citizens," which may affect black clients' desire to have them as
their representatives.222 A special report of a task force on gender, race,
and ethnic bias in the D.C. Circuit (Task Force) found that African
Americans (and attorneys of color generally) have to "overcome percep-
tions of incompetence. ' 22 3 The Task Force enlisted social scientists, de-
mographers, attorneys, academics, law students, and community
members and conducted public hearings, distributed written question-
naires, conducted interviews, focus groups, breakout sessions, and
roundtables. 22 4 The Task Force's mission was to gather information on
the ways in which gender, race, and ethnicity affect the work environ-
ment of the D.C. Circuit courts.22 5 The Task Force found that percep-
tions of African American attorney incompetence are widespread:
The professional experiences of African American, His-
panic, and Asian American attorneys, while different in
certain aspects, nevertheless had several strong common
factors. Principal among these were the need to over-
come perceptions of incompetence, the difficulty of es-
tablishing oneself in the 'mainstream' legal community,
and a sense of exclusion from opportunities provided to
serve or interact with the federal judiciary .... This per-
ception [of incompetence] took a particular form with
African American attorneys, according to both men and
women in different focus groups, who said their achieve-
ments were often discounted as the product of "affirnma-
tive action" rather than their own ability.226
There are some black communities where there are only a few black
lawyers. Some blacks have internalized negative misconceptions about
their own race due to the prevalence of anti-black stereotypes in society.
If, for these reasons (or for any other reason), black clients see black
lawyers as incompetent, they may prefer lawyers who are not black.
221 Wilkins, Identities and Roles, supra note 2, at 1514.
222 Id.
223 Special Committee on Race and Ethnicity, Report of the Special Committee on Race
and Ethnicity to the D.C. Circuit Task Force on Gender, Race, and Ethnic Bias, 64 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 189, 228 (1996).
224 See id. at 204.
225 See id. at 204-06.
226 Id. at 228 (footnote omitted).
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C. "The Black Lawyer Is Not Black Enough" Situation
A black client may not want a black lawyer if the lawyer is per-
ceived as being "not black enough." Black clients may have this percep-
tion because of the lawyer's "skin color, hair texture, wealth, academic
success," social status, or speech. 227 On another level, some black law-
yers may have rejected their blackness, in part, due to an education that
taught them to reject their culture and their history. 228 If a black lawyer
has any traits that are associated by some with whiteness or with what is
commonly referred to as "selling out," the lawyer may be seen as some-
one who is "not black enough" or alternatively, seen as someone who
cannot be trusted. 229
The concept of selling out can be illustrated using the civil rights
movement as a reference point.230 As the civil rights movement has sped
up the process of creating opportunities for upward financial mobility for
blacks, some blacks have divested themselves of their own culture and
"display[ed] a commitment to the values of the dominant culture." 231
Similarly, the black professional of today is sometimes perceived to be
"as interested in his or her class or profession as in his or her race."'232
These scenarios may cause blacks to label some black lawyers as sell-
outs.
A thorough examination of the social and psychological challenges
of being black in America and how that relates to the concept of selling
out is beyond the scope of this article. Suffice it to say that black Ameri-
cans may not choose someone who is perceived as a sell-out to represent
them.
Notwithstanding these arguments, empirical evidence suggests that
more often than not, black clients prefer black lawyers. 233 I argue that
the socio-political-legal and historical environment in which blacks live
has created a group identity which makes it easier for black clients to
trust and communicate with African American lawyers. Furthermore,
227 Ronald F. Ferguson, Test-Score Trends Along Racial Lines, 1971 to 1996: Popular
Culture and Community Academic Standards, in 1 AMERICA BECOMING, supra note 2, 348,
375-78; see also Kimberly Jade Norwood, The Virulence of BlackthinkTm and How Its Threat
of Ostracism Shackles Those Deemed Not Black Enough, 93 Ky. L.J. 143, 149 (2005).
228 See ELAINE RICHARDSON, AFRICAN AMERICAN LrrERAcIEs 10 (2003) (discussing how
the African American community as a whole has been negatively affected by an education that
encourages African American students to reject their culture).
229 See Elijah Anderson, The Precarious Balance: Race Man or Sellout?, in THE DARDEN
DILEMMA, supra note 140, at 114.
230 See id. at 117.
231 Id.
232 Id. at 118.
233 See Troccoli, supra note 6, at 2; see also Acevedo et al., supra note 4, at 65; Halliday-
Boykins et al., supra note 100, at 814; Terrell & Terrell, supra note 100, at 373-74; Watkins
Jr. & Terrell, supra note 101, at 196, 448-49.
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while there are exceptions to this rule, two of the three situations de-
scribed above (in which a black client may prefer a white lawyer) are
perpetuated by the perception of a two-tiered American judicial system.
Consequently, although these situations demonstrate greater complexity
in clients' responses to the American judicial system, they do not under-
mine the need for more black attorneys.
V. DAVID WILKINS, "BLEACHED OUT PROFESSIONALISM," AND
"PLAYING THE RACE CARD"
Since I conclude that racial identities have a place in the practice of
black lawyers and that non-profit organizations that represent large popu-
lations of black Americans need black lawyers, I would be remiss not to
discuss the relevance of David Wilkins' response to the normative ideal
of "bleached out professionalism. '234
In "Identities and Roles: Race, Recognition, and Professional Re-
sponsibility," Professor Wilkins responds to proponents of "bleached out
professionalism," or the notion that, once one becomes a lawyer, "this
'professional self' . . . subsumes all other aspects of a professional's
identity and.., becomes the sole legitimate basis for actions undertaken
within the professional role. '235 Wilkins recognizes that some profes-
sionals strongly believe that "non-professional" aspects of an individ-
ual's identity, such as race, class, sex, and socio-economic status, are not
relevant to their professional responsibilities. 236 Wilkins further ex-
plains, "Many Americans equate bleached out professionalism with...
fairness and opportunity," core concepts that are fundamental to the
dominant model of American legal ethics. 237 The proponents of
bleached out professionalism believe that "'the quality of lawyering and
of justice an individual receives does not depend on the group identity of
the lawyer or judge."' 238 Professor Wilkins explains:
234 Wilkins, Identities and Roles, supra note 2, at 1503-05. In his article, "Identities and
Roles," Wilkins responds to the concept of "Bleached Out Professionalism," as that term is
coined by Sanford Levinson. Id.; see also Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer:
Reflections on the Construction of Professional Identity, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1577, 1578-79
(1993). In "Gideon in White/Gideon in Black: Race and Identity in Lawyering," Anthony
Alfieri provides a thoughtful critique of race-neutral lawyering, using the writing and lawyer-
ing of John Hart Ely as a prism through which to argue for client-centered lawyering that
recognizes and incorporates diverse client identities in lieu of one "generalizable lawyer tech-
nique" that "marginalizes clients by presupposing their inferiority." 114 YALE L.J. 1459,
1476.
235 Wilkins, Identities and Roles, supra note 2, at 1503--04.
236 Id. at 1512.
237 Id.
238 Id. (quoting Russell G. Pearce, Jewish Lawyering in a Multicultural Society: A Mid-
rash on Levinson, 14 CARDozo L. Rav. 1613, 1629 (1993)).
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[T]he idea that lawyers should not consider their racial
identities when acting in their professional role is closely
linked to the understanding that the legal rules and pro-
cedures that lawyers interpret and implement are also
unaffected by issues of race. The claim that "our consti-
tution"-and indeed justice itself-"is color-blind" is
taken by many to be a bedrock principle of our legal
order. Lawyers who either explicitly or implicitly call
attention to racial issues are frequently viewed as under-
mining this ideal. 239
Wilkins argues that black lawyers' racial identities have a place in
the practice of black lawyers that does not undermine-but instead sup-
ports-the principles that underlie the dominant model of American legal
ethics.240 In making this argument, Wilkins focuses primarily on the
"use" of race at trial and during legal proceedings, using as examples Gil
Garcetti's decision to prosecute 0. J. Simpson in Los Angeles County
where it was likely that most of the jury would be black and Cochran's
strategy in the same case (for which he was accused of "playing the race
card"). 241
There are many differences between using race in this context and
in considering race when choosing a lawyer. For example, using race in
the trial context may be characterized as offensive or as "tainting" the
legal process. Some may argue that using race to influence a judge or
jury is an explicit violation of the norms of fairness and opportunity that
are core values of our legal system. One could argue that using race in
this way runs the risk of "manipulating" otherwise unassuming judges
and jurors. On the other hand, if one considers race when choosing a
legal representative, it may seem less viscerally offensive, as the action
may not be seen as "directly" affecting the legal process. It may be seen
as a matter of personal choice, rather than as a "pull the wool over your
eyes" method of legal maneuvering. However, the two may be seen as
one and the same. In fact, many argued that Cochran's race was one of
the reasons that he was added to Simpson's legal team, i.e., due to a
predicted advantage that the presence of a black attorney would give
Simpson with the jury. 2 4 2 I do not attempt to tackle these questions here.
I need not do so to echo Wilkins' argument in the context of the attorney-
client relationship. I believe, as does Wilkins, that racial identity has a
place in the practice of black lawyers that supports the principles that
underlie the dominant model of American legal ethics. In short,
239 Id. at 1514-15 (footnote omitted).
240 See id. at 1515-16.
241 See id. at 1515.
242 See id.
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"bleached out professionalism" is not the appropriate normative ideal for
African American lawyers.
In my view, Wilkins' assessment that proponents of bleached out
professionalism "exaggerate the danger of allowing lawyers to incorpo-
rate their identity into their professional roles" is accurate. 243 It is also
true that considering race in a way that enhances the attorney-client rela-
tionship supports the "colorblind norm of zealous advocacy."'244 Simi-
larly, Wilkins argues that if black lawyers "honor their legitimate role
obligations," as opposed to becoming "racial patriots," "race-conscious
lawyering strategies support, rather than undermine" the goals of our
American legal system. 245 This argument applies to the attorney-client
relationship. As long as black American lawyers honor their profes-
sional and ethical roles as lawyers, and do not subvert these roles-and
their accompanying norms and rules-to their racial identity, race-con-
scious lawyering can be "zealous advocacy" that supports, rather than
undermines, the goals of our American legal system.246
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct provide space for
lawyers to accommodate interpretive guidelines such as race into their
practice. 247 For example, ABA Model Rule 1.3 provides "[a] lawyer
shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a cli-
ent, ' 248 and ABA Model Rule 1.4 provides that a lawyer shall "keep the
client reasonably informed about the status of the matter. '2 49 The lan-
guage and plain meaning of these rules would seem to allow African
American lawyers to utilize their racial identity to enhance communica-
tion with their clients or to otherwise develop a level of trust with their
clients, provided that the end goal is to provide zealous representation.
An African American lawyer not using all of the tools at his disposal to
represent his client diligently and competently (assuming that it is possi-
ble to not "use" one's racial identity) would be akin to a lawyer knowing
which questions she needs to ask to get important information about her
client and refusing to ask these questions. Or, it would be akin to a
lawyer knowing that having a child's mother in the room will make the
child more comfortable (and thus improve the representation) and still
refuse to accommodate this request.
243 Id. at 1571.
244 Id. at 1516; see also Russell, supra note 37, at 791, n.67.
245 Wilkins, Identities and Roles, supra note 2, at 1584.
246 See id. at 1587. Wilkins offers four "safeguards" for consumers that lawyers must
follow if race-conscious lawyering is to been seen as enhancing, rather than undermining, the
legal process. See id. at 1590-91. I have only paraphrased Wilkins' argument here.
247 See id. at 1567.
248 MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2007).
249 R. 1.4(a)(3).
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The anecdote in the beginning of the Article illustrates my point.
Did I violate the rules of ethics by using my "race-based communica-
tion" to effectively communicate with my new clients? Did I violate the
rules of ethics when I looked into my client's grandmother's eyes and let
her know that "I knew what she meant," and therefore, that she could
feel comfortable talking to me? Or, did I give special meaning to Rule
1.1, which provides that "a lawyer shall provide competent representa-
tion to a client?"250
VI. WHEN AND WHERE DOES THE LAW
ALLOW COLOR-CONSCIOUSNESS?
For many legal services organizations, an obligation to hire African
American attorneys would implicate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (Title VII).251 Under Title VII, organizations can engage in prefer-
ential hiring in some circumstances to improve the economic and social
conditions of minorities and women.252 Title VII provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an em-
ployer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any indi-
vidual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin .... "253
In passing Title VII, "Congress recognized that employers were dis-
criminating against employees and potential employees based on charac-
teristics such as race and sex," 254 that such practices were harmful to
individuals and the economy, 255 and that sometimes organizations should
be able to engage in preferential hiring to improve the economic and
social condition of traditionally underserved populations. 256 Through the
bona fide occupational qualification exception (BFOQ), Congress per-
mitted covered employers to discriminate intentionally in narrowly de-
fined circumstances.257 Race, however, cannot be a BFOQ.258
250 R. 1.1.
251 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000).
252 See Michael J. Frank, Justifiable Discrimination in the News and Entertainment In-
dustries: Does Title VII Need a Race or Color BFOQ?, 35 U.S.F. L. REv. 473, 476 (2001).
253 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
254 Frank, supra note 252, at 475.
255 See id.
256 See id. at 476.
257 See id.
258 See id. Gender is the most commonly asserted bona fide occupational qualification
exception (BFOQ), along with age in the ADA context. See id. National origin is almost
never proffered as a BFOQ. See id. at 476-77; see also George Rutherglen, Discrimination
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However, in its parallel constitutional affirmative action jurispru-
dence, the Supreme Court found in Grutter that the attainment of racial
diversity in a public university body can, under certain circumstances, be
sufficiently compelling to survive strict scrutiny under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. 259 Although Grutter's "diversity rationale" was imple-
mented in the context of race-influenced admissions decisions at a public
university, Justice O'Connor's opinion speaks to a potentially expansive
diversity rationale that may be applicable to the workplace (in both the
public and private sectors) and thus applicable to legal services organiza-
tions.260 It appears this application of Grutter will likely be used as
courts continue to recognize the permeability of the line between Title
VII and constitutional affirmative action jurisprudence. 261 Tellingly, in
Grutter, the Court found that the benefits of affirmative action are "not
theoretical but real, as major American businesses have made clear that
the skills needed in today's increasingly global marketplace can only be
developed through exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas,
and viewpoints. '262
The Court's language in Grutter suggests that its "diversity ratio-
nale" is applicable in the employment context. 263 While the Supreme
Court has yet to evaluate an affirmative action plan which was instituted
pursuant to a diversity rationale under Title VII, there is reason to believe
that such a plan would pass judicial scrutiny.264 Courts have applied
Grutter in circumstances that are akin to the circumstances faced by
many legal services organizations that serve large populations of African
and Its Discontents, 81 VA. L. REv. 117, 140 (1995). While race cannot be a BFOQ, Brian
Leach makes a persuasive argument that we should revisit the proper place of occupational
need arguments within anti-discrimination law, and that if this is done, taking into considera-
tion the public's interest in the continued viability of certain occupations as well as the impor-
tance of racial and ethnic diversity to these occupations, such as the United States military,
Congress should remove the statutory barrier against race-based occupational need defenses.
See Leach, supra note 215, at 1094-96. Mr. Leach argues that this would bring greater intel-
lectual coherence to this area of the law. See id. While I agree with Mr. Leach, an in-depth
exploration of this argument is beyond the scope of this Article.
259 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003).
260 See id. at 330-33; see also Michael L. Foreman et al., The Continuing Relevance of
Race-Conscious Remedies and Programs in Integrating the Nation's Workforce, 22 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 81, 101-03 (2004).
261 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-33 (explaining how promoting diversity through a nar-
rowly tailored race-conscious admission program aids in preparing students to compete in an
increasingly diverse workforce); see also Forman et al., supra note 260, at 82.
262 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (citations omitted).
263 See N. Jeremi Duru, Fielding A Team For The Fans: The Societal Consequences and
Title VII Implications Of Race-Based Roster Construction in Professional Sport, 84 WASH. U.
L. Rav. 375, 413-14 (2006); see also Foreman et al., supra note 260, at 101-02; Rebecca
Harmer White, Affirmative Action in the Workplace: The Significance of Grutter?, 92 KY. L.J.
263, 270 (2003-2004).
264 See Foreman et al., supra note 260, at 101-02; see also White, supra note 263, at 270.
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American clients.2 65 Similarly, in the case of legal services organiza-
tions that desire to engage in preferential hiring for African American
attorneys, Grutter's diversity rationale could be used in the Title VII con-
text to expand the analysis under the Weber/Johnson line of cases. 266
Currently this line of cases allows for affirmative action plans under Title
VII, provided that they are instituted with the purpose of eliminating a
conspicuous or manifest racial imbalance within an organization.2 67
While Grutter's civic rationale for diversity (i.e., student diversity pro-
motes "'cross-racial' understanding, helps to break down racial stereo-
types, and enables students to better understand others of different
races" 268 ) does not apply directly to the employment context, Grutter's
discussion of the importance of diversity in the private workplace is
compelling.2 69
Diversity is an important consideration for legal services organiza-
tions looking to employ staff attorneys who are most likely to engender
trust and to facilitate communication with their clients. As recognized by
the Seventh Circuit in Petit,270 employers believe external legitimacy is a
particularly important business purpose. As discussed above, external
legitimacy is particularly important for legal services organizations that
work in a legal system that is perceived as racist against blacks.271
While such a rationale for diversity would seem to run contrary to the
265 In Petit, for example, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found racial diver-
sity to be a compelling interest for a police force charged with protecting a racially and ethni-
cally diverse Chicago. See Petit v. City of Chicago, 352 F.3d 1111, 1114 (7th Cir. 2003).
266 See Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 127 S.
Ct. 2738 (2007). As I discuss throughout this section, this, of course, would be a novel appli-
cation of Grutter.
267 See Charles A. Sullivan, Circling Back to the Obvious: The Convergence of Tradi-
tional and Reverse Discrimination in Title VII Proof, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1031, 1051-52
(2004). This is true even if the employer did not contribute to the imbalance. See id. at 1048.
The Court has further explained that such a plan is lawful only when "[it does] not unduly
trammel the interests of majority group members," indicating that such a situation might arise
if an affirmative action plan presented an absolute bar to white employment advancement, or
was permanent. Id. at 1052 (quoting United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208
(1979)). In tailoring its jurisprudence narrowly, the Court has acknowledged that Title VII
protects members of all races, including whites. See e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp.
Co., 427 U.S. 273, 279-80 (1976) (acknowledging Title VII's applicability to whites).
268 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
269 See Duru, supra note 263, at 413-14.
270 See Petit, 352 F.3d. at 1111.
271 See Howard, supra note 201, at 165 ("Minority participation provides, at the very
least, an appearance of fairness."); see also Ifill, supra note 201, at 101 ("[T]he absence of
minority judges on state trial courts contributes to an atmosphere of racial exclusion which, at
the very least, marginalizes African American lawyers, litigants and courtroom personnel in
many jurisdictions."); Stevenson, supra note 201, at 366 ('The perception of unfairness [of the
criminal justice system] is aggravated by a lack of racial diversity among judges and prosecu-
tors, which itself exacerbates courts' tolerance of unremediated illegal discrimination."). Brian
Leach argues that "the mere presence of African Americans in positions of leadership within
the U.S. military helps to dispel perceptions of institutional bias" and that "minority police
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Court's long-standing refusal272 under Title VII to permit companies to
compose their workforce based on customer preferences, 273 this rationale
embodies the purpose of Title VII. In fact, "[i]t does not offend Title
VII's heritage; it relies upon it. It would seem that external legitimacy
could further Title VII's purposes and could gain traction under Title VII
jurisprudence in the event of a Grutter-inspired expansion. 274
Any such expansion, of course, would have to wrestle with the im-
plications of a Supreme Court case (originally two cases, but consoli-
dated into one) that was decided in 2006, Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.275 As discussed below, the Par-
ents decision limits the ability of certain organizations to engage in
color-conscious actions. 276 In Parents, the Court issued competing opin-
ions invoking the mantle of Brown v. Board of Education277 and re-
stricted the means by which school districts can racially integrate their
student bodies.278 At this point, it is unclear if these cases will affect the
ability of legal services organizations to preferentially hire African
American attorneys.
In a 5-4 decision, the Parents Court ruled that the use of race in
student-assignment policies by the Seattle and Louisville School Districts
violated the rights of the white petitioners whose children were denied
admission to the school of their choice. 279 Chief Justice Roberts de-
clared that such plans were "directed only to racial balance, pure and
simple. '280 The Court did not find it necessary to directly address its
previous holding in Grutter, as the Court found that the notion of diver-
sity asserted by the schools in these cases was a more "limited notion of
diversity" 281 than was involved in Grutter. In addition, the majority
found that the plans in Parents relied on race in a "nonindividualized,
mechanical" way.28 2
The Court's conservative members argued that the school assign-
ment programs at issue were in conflict with the premise of Brown,
representation dispels public skepticism of law enforcement." Leach, supra note 215, at
1118-27.
272 See Duru, supra note 263, at 417.
273 See id. at 416.
274 Id. at 417.
275 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S.Ct. 2738, 2768
(2007) (consolidating two cases brought by parents challenging the integration programs in
school districts in Jefferson County, Kentucky, and Seattle, Washington).
276 See id.
277 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
278 See id. at 2767 (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
279 See id.
280 Id. at 2755; see also Linda Greenhouse, Justices, Voting 5-4, Limit the Use of Race in
Integration Plans, N.Y. Tmvsas, June 29, 2007, at Al.
281 Parents, 127 S. Ct. at 2754.
282 Id. (quoting Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 276 (2003)).
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which in their view requires an adherence to colorblindness.2 83 The ma-
jority's view is that even benign racial classifications should be struck
down, as the use of race in classification is always invidious. 284 Or in
the words of Chief Justice Roberts, "The way to stop discrimination on
the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race. 285
The Roberts opinion and Justice Thomas' concurrence (which to-
gether would have effectively outlawed the explicit consideration of race
when addressing de facto segregation in schools) represented a plurality
of the Court.286 While Justice Breyer provided an impassioned dissent-
"It is not often in the law that so few have so quickly changed so
much" 287-Justice Kennedy provided the fifth vote to overturn the as-
signment programs at issue. Nonetheless, Justice Kennedy distanced
himself from the majority and joined the dissent in ruling that the use of
race is permissible in certain circumstances, provided that the programs
are narrowly tailored. 288
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy gave some suggestions
on how school districts can constitutionally use race-conscious measures
to achieve diversity.289 In rejecting the plurality's complete embrace of a
colorblind constitution, Justice Kennedy criticized the Chief Justice's
"all-too-unyielding insistence that race cannot be a factor in instances
when, in my view, it may be taken into account. 290
Civil rights advocates have rightly decried this opinion as an aban-
donment of the "aspiration of integration and equal life chances manifest
in Brown,"291 but Justice Kennedy's concurrence shows that race-con-
sciousness has not been completely laid to rest by the Court. While an
in-depth discussion of the implications of this decision for affirmative
action programs in hiring is beyond the scope of this Article, any such
programs will likely hinge, in part, on Justice Kennedy's concurrence. A
concurrence in which Justice Kennedy recognizes that (1) "[t]he endur-
ing hope is that race should not matter; the reality is that too often it
283 See id. at 2768; see also Jess Bravin & Daniel Golden, Court Limits How Districts
Integrate Schools-Race-Based Policy Ban Augurs Broad Changes; Clash Over Brown Case,
WALL ST. J., June 29, 2007, at Al.
284 See Parents, 127 S. Ct. at 2774; see also Bravin & Golden, supra note 283, at Al.
285 Parents, 127 S. Ct. at 2768.
286 See id. at 2746.
287 These words were not included in Justice Breyer's written opinion, but rather, are
statements that the Justice made from the bench during the Parents oral argument. Green-
house, supra note 280, at Al.
288 See id. at 2792 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
289 See id. at 2788-97.
290 Id. at 2791.
291 Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Demise of Brown vs. Board of Education?: Creating a
Blueprint to Achieving Racial Justice in the 21st Century, NAACP SpEc. ED. 4 (Jan./Feb.
2007), http://www.naacp.org/advocacy/theadvocate/sped_0107.pdf.
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does," 292 (2) the plurality is "too dismissive of the legitimate interest
government has in ensuring that all people have equal opportunity re-
gardless of their race", 293 and (3) in the real world, colorblindness "can-
not be a universal constitutional principle. '294 In short, Grutter is still
good law and its "diversity rationale" seems to be intact.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Parents is relevant to my argu-
ment for a reason other than a strictly legal one. The Parents decision
will affect how my argument is received. In response to Parents, the
American Civil Rights Union295 issued a press release, stating that the
"'ruling narrowly upheld the colorblind principle that all Americans re-
gardless of race are equal under the law. But there's clearly more work
to be done until at least . . .[five] members of the Supreme Court ac-
knowledge that just as our Constitution is colorblind, our public schools
should be as well.'"296 Similarly, Ward Connerly of the American Civil
Rights Institute declared,
The Supreme Court today made a glorious decision that
directly fits with our plans to eliminate race in all facets
of American public life .... This Supreme Court deci-
sion shows that the era of race preferences is quickly
coming to an end. The Court is finally starting to catch
up with what the American people have known for
years: Race has no place in American public life.297
The Parents decision provided a victory to the ideology of color-
blindness. Consequently, calls to get beyond race now have the cover of
the Supreme Court.298 Justice Harlan's famous pronouncement in Plessy
292 Parents, 127 S. Ct. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
293 Id.
294 Id. at 2792.
295 Despite its name, the American Civil Rights Union (ACRU) is not in any way affili-
ated with the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). The ACRU is a non-profit organiza-
tion that differentiates itself from the ACLU, an organization that it criticizes for selectively
supporting the Bill of Rights. See Center for Corporate Policy, http://www.corporatepolicy.
org/issues/ACRU.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2008).
296 Press Release, America Civil Rights Union, ACRU Applauds Another Step Towards a
Colorblind Society (June 28, 2007), http://www.theacru.org/blog/2007/06/pressrelease-acru
applauds anotherstep-towardsacolorblind-society/ (last visited Nov. 29, 2008) (quoting
Horace Cooper, ACRU Senior Fellow and constitutional law expert).
297 Press Release, American Civil Rights Institute, Connerly Declares Supreme Court De-
cision "Glorious Victory" (June 28, 2007), http://www.acri.org/pr-062807.html (last visited
Nov. 29, 2008) (quoting Ward Connerly of the American Civil Rights Institute).
298 See Ian F. Haney L6pez, Colorblind to the Reality of Race in America, 53 CHRON.
HIGHER EDUC., Nov. 3, 2006, at B6, available at http://chronicle.comweekly/v53/i 11/1 lb00
601 .htm (last visited Nov. 29, 2008) (discussing the possible societal implications of the color-
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v. Ferguson-"Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor
tolerates classes among citizens" 299-has now moved beyond the ideal,
to become the reality, of American society.300 Since some people genu-
inely believe that the best way to get beyond racism is to get beyond
race, my argument may be seen as part of the problem.
For Thurgood Marshall, as counsel for the NAACP legal defense
fund, colorblindness represented the dismantling of de jure segrega-
tion.301 However, "[i]n the wake of the civil-rights movement's limited
but significant triumphs, the relationship between colorblindness and ra-
cial reform changed markedly. ' 30 2 As legal victories did not directly
translate into the eradication of inequality, progressives increasingly
pushed for "affirmative race-conscious remedies. ' 30 3 Ironically, in this
environment, the ideology of colorblindness could now safely be used by
those who were resistant to racial progress, as it now had the "cover" of
having been previously advocated by those in the civil rights
movement. 30 4
In the 1970s, the Supreme Court's belief in equality made it impos-
sible to adhere to the ideology of colorblindness. 30 5 However, in the
1980s "the [C]ourt presented race as a phenomenon called into existence
just when someone employed a racial term." 30 6 Unfortunately, "[t]hat
approach ignores the continuing power of race as a society-altering
category."307
Thus, in response to the advocates of colorblindness who would
identify color consciousness as part of the problem, it is important to
recognize that there is still racial hierarchy in this country. 30 8 The elimi-
nation of affirmative action programs in the employment context should
blind ideology espoused by the majority and arguing that the use of this ideology should
depend on the remediation of racial hierarchy).
299 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
300 The ideal of colorblindness has been traced to Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v.
Ferguson, but this ideology may have existed in the 1840s before Plessy was decided, when
black children in Massachusetts challenged so-called separate but equal schools. See ANDREW
KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTrrT1ON 40-52 (1992) (discussing Roberts v. City of Boston,
59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198 (1849)).
301 See L6pez, supra note 298.
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 See id.
305 See id.
306 Id.
307 Id.
308 See id. In 1998, the American Anthropological Association counseled the federal gov-
ernment to phase out the use of the term "race" in the collection of data because the concept
has no scientific justification in human biology. See American Anthropological Association,
Statement on "Race" (May 17, 1998), http://www.aaanet.org/stmts/racepp.htm (last visited
Nov. 29, 2008). The problem with this recommendation is that social concepts of race are still
linked to forms of discrimination.
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be conditioned on the elimination of racial hierarchy. 309 A careful dis-
tinction should be made between the moral superiority of colorblindness
as policy and the lure of colorblindness as an ideal for American soci-
ety.3 10 As Professor Ian F. Haney L6pez provides:
Contemporary colorblindness is a set of understand-
ings-buttressed by law and the courts, and reinforcing
racial patterns of white dominance-that define how
people comprehend, rationalize, and act on race. As ap-
plied, however much some people genuinely believe that
the best way to get beyond racism is to get beyond race,
colorblindness continues to retard racial progress. It
does so for a simple reason: It focuses on the surface, on
the bare fact of racial classification, rather than looking
down into the nature of social practices. It gets racism
and racial remediation exactly backward, and insulates
new forms of race baiting ....
Colorblindness badly errs when it excuses racially correlated ine-
quality in our society as unproblematic so long as no one uses a racial
epithet. It also egregiously fails when it tars every explicit reference to
race. To break the interlocking patterns of racial hierarchy, there is no
other way but to focus on, talk about, and put into effect constructive
policies explicitly engaged with race.311
My ode then to Justice Roberts, and to those proponents of color-
blindness as a policy prescription in today's society, is Justice Black-
mun's statement "in defending affirmative action in [Regents of the
University of California v.] Bakke: 'In order to get beyond racism, we
must first take account of race. There is no other way."' 312
The underlying theme of this Article is that the problems of blacks
cannot be solved by removing race-consciousness from the dialogue
about diversity in the legal profession. In short, legal services organiza-
tions that represent large populations of black Americans should be race
309 See L6pez, supra note 298.
310 See id.
311 Id.
312 Id. (quoting Justice Blackmun in Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring)); see also Bobo, supra note 25, at 284-85. Bobo sug-
gests that talking about race and racism may be a difficult endeavor in a society in which there
is such a divergence of opinion as to the importance of race. Bobo, supra note 25, at 284-85.
In part, Bobo suggests that
[s]ustained and constructive discourse about matters of race will surely remain difficult insofar
as Blacks are (1) more likely than Whites to see discrimination in particular domains and
situations; (2) more likely to see discrimination as institutional rather than episodic; (3) more
likely to see discrimination as a central factor in larger patterns of racial inequality; and (4)
more likely to regard racial discrimination as personally important and emotionally involving.
Id.
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conscious and hire more black lawyers. This country's socio-political-
legal and historical environment has made blacks uniquely able to com-
municate with and gain the trust and confidence of their black American
clients.
My goal in writing this Article is not only to make a normative
statement as to whether legal services organizations should engage in
preferential hiring. My intention is also to contribute to the intellectual
discourse as to whether black lawyers bring unique benefits to black cli-
ents. While we may be uncomfortable talking about race, we cannot let
shame silence us as a society. We owe each other at least this much.
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